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Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A
Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual
Litigation Machine
Dan Awrey,† Blanaid Clarke,‡ and Sean J. Griffith*
Regulation by litigation has driven U.S. merger regulation to crisis. The
reliance on private lawsuits to police disclosures and potential conflicts of
interest in mergers, takeovers, and other control transactions has resulted in the
filing of claims after every major transaction. However, it has failed to achieve
meaningful benefits for shareholders and has instead deprived them of
potentially valuable rights. Regulation by litigation has devolved into attorney
rent-seeking, and the raft of substantive and procedural reforms aimed at
resolving the crisis has failed.
There is an alternative to regulation by litigation. Drawing upon the code
and panel-based models of merger regulation in the United Kingdom and
Ireland, this Article explores whether a regulatory model might be better at
protecting shareholder interests in merger transactions. A regulatory alternative
holds a number of significant advantages, including greater speed,
responsiveness, certainty, and lower administrative costs. In light of these
potential advantages, it is remarkable that no U.S. state has experimented with
a code and panel-based model of merger regulation. We explain the persistent
difference between the U.S. and Anglo-Irish models by reference to interest
group politics and, in particular, the power of the bar to influence corporate law
reforms in the United States.
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Introduction
The American model of corporate law is regulation by litigation. This
model relies upon private lawsuits to oversee managerial conduct in mergers,
takeovers, and other control transactions and to ensure the adequacy of
disclosure to shareholders.1 No regulatory body oversees the negotiation and
consummation of these transactions.2 Rather, shareholders’ right to sue corporate
managers for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with merger transactions
leads judges to “regulate” mergers by deciding the cases brought before them.
But there is a well-known crisis in merger litigation in the United States.3
In spite of generating lawsuits in virtually every deal, the system generates no

1. For brevity, we will refer to these transactions simply as “mergers” and, except where
otherwise provided, to regulation or litigation relating to these matters simply as “merger regulation” or
“merger litigation.”
2.
The role of securities law and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in
these transactions is described in more detail at infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
3.
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE AND FALL AND
FUTURE 90 (2015) (noting that in the context of merger class actions, “incentives to sue have become
excessive, and litigation is growing out of control, like algae in a petri dish”); see also Stephen Bainbridge,
Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (contending that
merger litigation is a “problem that has reached crisis proportions”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
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real litigation. Instead, suits are brought for their nuisance value and settled for
non-monetary relief, typically in the form of supplemental disclosures in the
proxy statement. The shareholder class receives nothing, but the lawyers on both
sides collect fees from the corporation. Judges no longer decide cases but rather
approve settlements, essentially trading their gavels for rubber stamps. The
devolution of merger litigation is a concern not only for the shareholders who
are made to waive valuable rights for worthless settlements, or for the
corporations that fund the perpetual litigation machine. The crisis may be most
concerning for corporate law itself, which has been thoroughly discredited in the
process.4
There is an alternative to regulation by litigation—that is, simply,
regulation. The alternative regulatory model thrives on the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean where both the United Kingdom and Ireland have adopted a
model based on the application of detailed ex ante codes to the conduct of
bidders, targets, and other market participants in takeovers and merger
transactions. These codes are drafted, interpreted, and enforced by expert panels
comprised of bankers, lawyers, institutional investors, and other market
professionals. Litigants, courtrooms, and judges are rarely involved. In spite of

Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L.
REV. 19, 27 (2016) (noting that “litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is now of
epidemic proportions”); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation:
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 558 (2015) (noting that “[d]eal
litigation is pervasive in the United States”); Joel E. Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic
Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 883 (2016) (“Disclosure settlement practice
has operated as a shadow, parallel legal system within the Court of Chancery competing for judicial
resources with a full docket of adversarial litigation. The institutionalization of routine disclosure
settlements parodied the procedures for adjudicating claims of breach of fiduciary duty.”); Sean J. Griffith,
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (“The defects of shareholder litigation have long been known.”); Charles R.
Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 829, 840-41 (2014) (emphasizing indicia of litigation agency costs in merger class actions and
arguing that the merits count for little in such claims); Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status
Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155 (2011)
(discussing merger lawsuits as “cookie-cutter complaints”); David H. Webber, Private Policing of
Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 909 (2014) (“The debate over transactional class
and derivative actions continues to rage both inside and outside academia.”); Marianna Wonder, The
Changing Odds of the Chancery Lottery, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2382 (2016) (noting that the volume
of merger filings and the “similarity between so many of these cases . . . indicates that M&A litigation
has become routine, regardless of actual merit”); Matthew D. Cain & Steven D. Solomon, Takeover
Litigation in 2015 (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & the Econ., Working Paper, 2017), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2715890 [http://perma.cc/Y9U5-5NGM] (providing empirical evidence of litigation activity
and outcomes); Olga Koumrian, Recent Developments in Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and
Acquisitions, CORNERSTONE RES. 1 (2012), http://www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/Shareholder
_MandA_Litigation.pdf [http://perma.cc/JF63-GVT4] (providing empirical evidence of litigation activity
and outcomes).
4.
See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 65-66, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Hldg. Corp., No.
9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (No. 9730) (noting that “omnipresent litigation
undercuts the credibility of the litigation process” and leads observers to “look askance at stockholder
litigation without remembering that stockholder litigation is actually an important part of the Delaware
legal framework,” ultimately undercutting “Delaware’s credibility as an honest broker in the legal realm”).
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this—or perhaps because of it—these code and panel-based regimes are
generally viewed as highly successful: offering flexibility, speed, and certainty
at relatively low administrative cost.5 In light of the success of the Anglo-Irish
model, the obvious question becomes whether a similar approach might work in
the United States. Remarkably, it has not been tried.
The divergence in regulatory modalities between the United States and the
Anglo-Irish systems is especially striking given the similarities between the
underlying legal and economic systems. The legal systems in all three countries
are based on common law principles. All three countries have highly developed
stock markets with dispersed ownership of publicly traded firms.6 All three take
agency costs as the central problem of corporate governance.7 And all three—
especially the United States and the United Kingdom—experience high levels of
takeover and merger activity in comparison with other countries.8 Yet, in spite
of the American federal system and its fifty “laborator[ies]” of democracy,9 each
with a strong incentive to compete for corporate charters,10 no state has yet been
tempted to adopt the Anglo-Irish model of merger regulation. Instead, all fifty
states apply a form of regulation by litigation.
This Article explores the two models of merger regulation, tracing the
development and current operation of each and exploring their relative costs and
benefits. This part of our analysis addresses comparative law questions,
including how such closely related legal and economic systems developed
widely divergent approaches to merger regulation and, more importantly, why
these divergent approaches have persisted in an era of convergence and
globalization. This comparative analysis is not merely descriptive, but rather
serves as a springboard for our larger normative inquiry comparing the relative
efficiency of the Anglo-Irish and the U.S. systems. After weighing these
considerations in the abstract, we propose a hybrid regulatory model to address
the crisis in U.S. merger litigation.
In presenting this account, our Article intersects several lines of scholarly
debate. First, in offering an alternative to regulation by litigation, we contribute
to the corporate and procedural law literature focusing on how litigation
effectively (or ineffectively) serves regulatory objectives, addressing the
5.
See infra Part II.
6.
See generally Rafael LaPorta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471 (1999).
7.
See John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29-31 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017)
(explaining that the general function of corporate law in terms of controlling conflicts of interest can be
understood as a series of agency problems).
8.
Of the 23,123 completed public takeovers reported in the ZEPHYR corporate
information database as of July 18, 2016, 6,675 (28.87%) took place in the United States and 2,911
(12.59%) took place in the United Kingdom. The reported figure for Ireland was 304.
9.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
10.
See infra Section IV.A.
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promise and peril of ordinary shareholders serving as “private attorneys
general.”11 Second, we engage the law and economics literature, analyzing the
costs and benefits of alternative models of regulation and applying these to the
real world context of shareholder litigation. Third, in addressing why no U.S.
state has experimented with a regulatory alternative to merger litigation, we
contribute to the corporate law literature on interstate competition for corporate
charters, shedding light on how the “race to the top” or “race to the bottom”
might actually work. Fourth, we apply insights from the interest group theory of
corporate law to highlight the dominance of the corporate bar as the Achilles
heel of Delaware corporate law. Fifth and finally, we contribute to the
comparative law literature by demonstrating how the form of legal regulation
can be as important in determining outcomes as the substance of the rules.
From this Introduction, the Article proceeds as follows. The first half—
Parts I and II—is largely descriptive. Part I describes the American system of
regulation by litigation through the lens of the dominant producer of American
corporate law, Delaware, and analyses the forces leading to the current crisis in
shareholder litigation and the state’s various efforts to address it. Part II explores
the key substantive and procedural features of the code and panel-based modes
of merger regulation adopted in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the rationales
underpinning their emergence and development, and the experience of those
regimes to date. The second half of the Article—Parts III and IV—is more
normative. Part III engages the literature comparing the costs and benefits of
litigation versus regulation and articulates a code and panel-based system of
merger regulation that could be adopted by any state as an alternative to
regulation by litigation. Part IV then explores the persistence of the regulation
by litigation paradigm in an era of cross-border convergence and globalization,
asking why no state has experimented with this alternative regulatory modality,
and ultimately identifying the key obstacles that need to be surmounted in order
to finally resolve the crisis in U.S. merger litigation. The Article then closes with
a brief summary and conclusion.
I. Regulation by Litigation and the Crisis in U.S. Merger Litigation
In the United States, corporate law governs the internal affairs of the
corporation—the relationship between shareholders and managers—which is, in
general, a matter of state law.12 U.S. companies can organize in any U.S. state,
without regard to residence or principal place of business.13 As a result,

11.
See COFFEE, supra note 3.
12.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also Frederick C. Tung, Before
Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006) (explaining the internal
affairs doctrine and the role of the states in corporate law).
13.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 212 (1991) (“Managers may incorporate in any state, no matter where the firm’s
assets, employees, and investors are located.”).
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corporations effectively choose the state law under which their internal affairs
will be governed when they decide where to incorporate.14 And they
overwhelmingly choose Delaware.15 More than half of all public companies and
an even larger share (65.6%) of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in
Delaware.16
Corporations choose Delaware for its law, yet the Delaware General
Corporation Law contains few mandatory terms.17 Instead, it is broadly
“enabling.”18 Nevertheless, the statute does have a central idea—that is, the
conferral of managerial authority upon the board of directors.19 Shareholders
unhappy with management’s use of this authority can sell their shares, vote the
board out of office, or sue.20 Hence, insofar as Delaware regulates the internal
affairs of American corporations, it does so principally through the shareholder
suit. Delaware law, in other words, constitutes regulation by litigation.
This part explores the implications of this regulatory modality, which is
shared by every other U.S. state, demonstrating how it has come to police both
managerial motives and the adequacy of disclosures in merger transactions.
Section I.A reviews shareholder litigation in Delaware, focusing on merger
litigation as the paradigmatic example. Section I.B describes the crisis in
shareholder litigation in Delaware and the spread of the crisis to other U.S. states.
Section I.C reviews attempts by Delaware to address this crisis.

14.
See Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in 2 OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 2 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (“This arrangement provides firms
with a choice, they can select their governing law from among the states regardless of their physical
location; thus the notion that states offer a product that corporations purchase, by means of incorporation
fees . . . .”).
15.
See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 887 (1990) (noting that “over forty percent of the New York Stock
Exchange-listed companies and over fifty percent of the Fortune 500 companies” incorporate in Delaware
and that “eighty-two percent of the firms that reincorporate move to Delaware”); see also Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. ECON. 383, 389 (2003);
Robert Daines, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 538 (2001) (noting that Delaware leads in a study of IPOs); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 244
(1985) (providing a significant study of re-incorporations and jurisdictional choice of companies).
16.
Div. Corps, Why Incorporate in Delaware?, ST. DEL., http://corp.delaware.gov
[http://perma.cc/Z2PF-EMFD].
17.
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 543 (1990) (arguing that the optional nature of all but the most basic
procedural requirements makes the corporate statute “trivial”).
18.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1417 (1989) (“The corporate code in almost every state is an ‘enabling’ statute.”).
19.
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some
of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 675 (2005) (“The central idea of
Delaware’s approach to corporate law is the social utility of an active, engaged central management. That
idea is expressed by our statute, which states the fundamental principle that the ‘business and affairs of
the corporation are managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.’” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8 § 141(a) (2015))).
20.
WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 177 (2d ed. 2007).
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A. The Emergence of Delaware Corporate Law
Before Delaware, there was New Jersey. Building upon advantages
conferred by the early abolition of special chartering in favor of general
incorporation and the state’s proximity to both New York City and Philadelphia,
New Jersey took the early lead in the interstate market for corporate charters
when it passed a series of statutes between 1888 and 1893 that expressly
authorized corporations to own shares of other corporations.21 While New Jersey
was not the first state to allow holding companies, the state’s unambiguous
statutory commitment to the holding company structure offered refuge to
transaction planners at a time when business conglomerates were generally under
siege.22 A few years later, in 1896, New Jersey amended its statute to grant
corporations the power, with few exceptions, to engage in “any lawful business
or purpose whatsoever” and to provide for perpetual corporate existence.23
Companies flocked to New Jersey in the wake of these amendments,24 and, by
1900, New Jersey had become the dominant state of incorporation in the United
States, especially for large businesses, providing the state with a significant
source of revenue.25 Nevertheless, other states, notably Delaware and Maine,
remained competitive by enacting corporate legislation mimicking the New
Jersey statute.26
Governor Woodrow Wilson destroyed New Jersey’s dominance in the
market for corporate charters when he insisted on aligning New Jersey corporate
law with federal antitrust policy.27 In 1913, Wilson pushed a series of enactments
21.
See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Charters and the Rise
and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 331-45 (2007) (discussing the 1889 statute’s
passage); John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., Note, Ropes of Sand: State Antitrust Statutes Bound by Their Original
Scope, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 353, 371 n.104 (2017) (discussing the statutes and their effect on New Jersey’s
competitive advantage). The 1889 statute, the primary source catalyzing the growth in New Jersey’s
incorporation rate, allowed corporations to “purchase . . . property necessary for their business, or the
stock of any company or companies owning . . . property necessary for their business.” 1889 N.J. Laws
412, 414 (emphasis added).
22.
Federal hostility to large-scale mergers and acquisitions was expressed in antitrust
(competition) policy. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 316 (1977); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 108-232 (1955).
23.
An Act Concerning Corporations, 1896 N.J. Laws 277, 279-80 (1896).
24.
See Yablon, supra note 21, at 344-45.
25.
Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1
DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 267 (1976) (noting that “95 percent of the nation’s major corporations were
chartered in New Jersey”).
26.
See Yablon, supra note 21, at 358-63.
27.
Then-Governor Woodrow Wilson said:
The corporation laws of the state notoriously stand in need of alteration. They are
manifestly inconsistent with the policy of the Federal Government and with the interests
of the people in the all-important matter of monopoly, to which the attention of the nation
is now so earnestly directed. The laws of New Jersey, as they stand, so far from checking
monopoly actually encourage it.
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known as the Seven Sister Acts through the legislature, each of which
“drastically tightened [New Jersey] law relating to corporations and trusts.”28
The new laws restricted stock issuances, regulated mergers, and, critically,
reversed the statutory authorization of the holding company structure,
introducing new restrictions on the ability of corporations to hold shares in other
business entities.29
By 1913, Delaware corporate law was already a substantive copy of New
Jersey corporate law.30 But Delaware did not follow New Jersey in adopting the
regulatory framework of the Seven Sisters Acts. Instead, Delaware invited New
Jersey corporations to migrate one state south, and the corporations accepted the
invitation. It did not matter that New Jersey repealed most of the Seven Sisters
provisions in 1917. New Jersey’s credibility was destroyed. The corporations
stayed in Delaware.
In the wake of the Great Crash of 1929, the federal government assumed a
larger regulatory role in corporate affairs, most notably with the enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“Exchange Act”).31 Broadly speaking, both statutes focus on fraud and
disclosure in the securities market, with the Securities Act regulating the primary
market—transactions involving a corporate issuer—and the Exchange Act
regulating secondary market trading.32 The creation of regulatory power over
these transactions also gave the federal government authority to regulate what
might otherwise be viewed as core corporate governance functions—functions
previously governed solely by state law. For example, in the merger context, the
federal securities laws now prescribe tender offer procedures and the form and
content of disclosures provided in connection with shareholder voting.33 Perhaps
most importantly, the federal government could, and many have argued should,
subsume all corporate governance regulation.34 So far, however, it has not gone
down this path. As a result, state corporate law remains the principal source of
law governing merger activity, a role it performs by means of the shareholder
suit.

New Jersey’s Corporation Laws, 96 NATION 91 (1913).
28.
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
29.
See 1913 N.J. Laws 23-31.
30.
See Seligman, supra note 25, at 271-74.
31.
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77(a) (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012)).
32.
See Seligman, supra note 25.
33.
The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2012)).
34.
See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Cary, supra note 28.
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B. Merger Litigation in Delaware
Although shareholders can sue over almost anything managers do,35
application of the business judgment rule ensures that they will generally lose.36
As long as a board is not conflicted, its business decisions are not subject to
judicial second-guessing, and shareholder challenges are quickly dismissed.37 A
major exception to this principle, however, occurs when shareholders challenge
mergers—a context in which the business judgment rule does not apply. These
transactions instead receive a heightened form of judicial scrutiny, either
“enhanced scrutiny” or, in the case of clear conflicts, “entire fairness.”38
Enhanced judicial scrutiny has its origins in one of the first Delaware cases
to consider takeover defenses. In 1964, the Court of Chancery heard Cheff v.
Mathes, a derivative suit challenging a company’s actions to ward off a takeover
attempt.39 Although it ultimately favored management, Cheff nevertheless
highlighted a context—mergers—in which management disinterest could not be
casually assumed.40 This nascent suspicion of management’s motives in control
transactions later bloomed in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,41 applying enhanced scrutiny to takeover defenses,
and the court’s 1986 opinion in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings,42 applying enhanced scrutiny to mergers.43 In either case, the court

35.
See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004) (explaining that this type
of litigation generally occurs in the form of a derivative suit but that when the injury is to the shareholder
directly—such as actions impacting voting rights or the consideration received in a merger transaction—
shareholder suits may be brought as class actions).
36.
See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 50 DUKE L.J. 8, 11-13 (2005) (describing operation of the business
judgment rule).
37.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
38.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing
and fair price in non-arm’s length transactions); see also Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635,
644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the involvement of a special committee and a majority of the minority vote
may shift the standard of review to the business judgment rule). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at
20-21, Swomley v. Schlect, No. 9355-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 4470951 (granting a
motion to dismiss on the basis of procedural protections and noting that “the whole point of encouraging
[the M & F Worldwide] structure was to create a situation where defendants could effectively structure a
transaction so that they could obtain a pleading-stage dismissal against breach of fiduciary duty claims”).
39.
199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
40.
Id. at 554 (holding that defensive action was proper, as long as entrenchment was
not the board’s sole or primary motivation).
41.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of
the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”).
42.
506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
43.
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1993)
(incorporating the diffuse-to-controlling shareholder aspect of the standard).
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requires the board to justify the transaction in light of shareholder—rather than
management—interests.44
In addition to heightened judicial scrutiny of management’s motives in
planning and executing control transactions, Delaware law also provides for
judicial scrutiny of the sufficiency of the information provided to shareholders.45
This cause of action is an implicit corollary to shareholders’ statutory right to
vote on the transaction.46 Because the failure to disclose all material information
in connection with a transaction effectively deprives shareholders of their
statutory voting rights, target boards have an implied duty to disclose.47 As a
result, in addition to policing conflicts of interest, corporate law courts have a
role in determining whether the disclosures provided to shareholders are
adequate to enable them to make an informed decision on the transaction. Hence,
the two principal “regulatory” functions of corporate law courts are to police
conflicts of interest in the transaction process and ensure the adequacy of
corporate disclosures.48
Merger litigation invokes both of these core regulatory functions.49 Cases
are brought on a class basis, often with a single shareholder representing the
rights of all shareholders as a class.50 Complaints begin by using Revlon to
challenge the merger process, thereby laying the foundation for setting aside the

44.
See J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2013); accord Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d
442, 457-60 (Del. Ch. 2011) (describing the range of situations to which enhanced scrutiny may apply).
But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3337-38
(2013) (disputing the extension of enhanced scrutiny into non-traditional applications).
45.
See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (“[D]irectors of Delaware
corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the
board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”).
46.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2012) (providing for a shareholder vote in
a long form merger transaction).
47.
See Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Specter of Omnicare, 38 J. CORP. L. 753,
780-85 (2013) (discussing the implied duty to inform shareholders fully in connection with the merger
vote).
48.
See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010) (treating the
fiduciary duties imposed by states on corporate managers as a form of government regulation).
49.
Our reference to “merger litigation” here and throughout the Article is to fiduciary
duty litigation brought to enforce shareholder rights in the context of merger transactions, not litigation
brought to enforce shareholders’ statutory appraisal rights. Although implicated by the same underlying
transaction, appraisal actions are substantively and procedurally distinct from fiduciary duty claims. We
therefore treat appraisal actions and the potential reform of Delaware’s approach to appraisal as outside
the scope of this article. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2012); see also, Charles R. Korsmo & Minor
Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551 (2015).
50.
Because the issues will be common to all shareholders, merger claims can be—and
almost always are—brought on a representative basis, typically in the form of a class action. Thompson
& Thomas, supra note 35, at 168 (reporting the results of a multiyear study of Delaware Chancery Court
litigation finding that “[a]lmost all (94 percent: 772 of 824) class action suits arise in an acquisition setting
whereas almost all (90 percent: 123 of 137) of the derivative suits arise in a non-acquisition setting”).
Formally, class action plaintiffs represent the interest of shareholders as a group, and derivative suit
plaintiffs represent the corporation. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 37-44.
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business judgment rule in favor of enhanced judicial scrutiny.51 But once the
provisional proxy statement is released, complaints are amended to incorporate
this information and include disclosure allegations. Because the Delaware
standard for awarding expedited discovery requires a “colorable claim and . . . a
possibility of . . . irreparable injury,”52 and shareholders can always argue that
they will be irreparably injured by the failure to disclose material information
prior to the shareholder vote,53 shareholder plaintiffs are virtually assured of
expedited discovery.54 Unfortunately, this is where the adversarial process
typically ends. As explained by the Court in In re Trulia:
Once the litigation is on an expedited track and the prospect of an injunction
hearing looms, the most common currency used to procure a settlement is the
issuance of supplemental disclosures to the target’s stockholders before they are
asked to vote on the proposed transaction. The theory behind making these
disclosures is that, by having the additional information, stockholders will be
better informed when exercising their franchise rights. Given the Court’s
historical practice of approving disclosure settlements when the additional
information is not material, and indeed may be of only minor value to the
stockholders, providing supplemental disclosures is a particularly easy “give” for
55
defendants to make in exchange for a release.

Rather than engaging in serious adversarial discovery, the parties settle.
The impetus for settlement is spurred by the hold-up value inherent in every
merger claim.56 Every case, if seriously pursued, has the potential to impose
burdensome discovery on defendants and, should unfavorable information be

51.
Most complaints arising out of merger transactions allege some defect in the sale
process, such as an insufficiently competitive auction or excessive deal-protection discouraging
subsequent offers. See Koumrian, supra note 3, at 1 (“Common allegations include the deal terms not
resulting from a sufficiently competitive auction, the existence of restrictive deal protections that
discouraged additional bids, or the impact of various conflicts of interests, such as executive retention or
change-of-control payments to executives. Complaints also typically allege that a target’s board failed to
disclose sufficient information to shareholders to enable their informed vote. Insufficient disclosure
allegations have focused on information related to the sale process, the reasons for the board’s actions,
financial projections, and the financial advisors’ fairness opinions.”).
52.
Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 13845, 1994 WL 672698, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 15, 1994).
53.
Sinchareonkul v. Fahnemann, No. 10543, 2015 WL 292314, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Jan.
22, 2015) (“[T]he standard for expedition, colorability, which simply implies a non-frivolous set of issues,
is even lower than the ‘conceivability’ standard applied on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting In re BioClinica,
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272, 2013 WL 5631233, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013))); In re BioClinica, 2013
WL 5631233, at *4 n.46 (“The standard for a motion to expedite is colorability and the standard for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is reasonable conceivability–in my view, a higher, although still
minimal, pleading burden.”).
54.
As a result of this argument and the anticipated outcome under the Delaware
standard, most defendants agree to some form of expedited discovery. See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A.
Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A “How To” Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281 (2017).
55.
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892-93 (Del. Ch. 2016).
56.
See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“[E]ach Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but because it cannot
be dismissed.”).
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unearthed, enjoin the transaction at least until such information can be
disseminated to shareholders.57 Because time is of the essence in most control
transactions, defendants regard any potential delay as a serious threat. Moreover,
settlement provides defendants with a class-wide release of claims precluding
litigation of any claim arising from the same underlying facts, a benefit that the
most resonant courtroom victory could not provide.58 Defendants therefore have
an incentive to settle every case, however frivolous.
Intuiting defendants’ incentives and the clear pathway to settlement present
in every merger claim, plaintiffs’ lawyers similarly have little incentive to invest
substantial effort in any one case.59 Instead, they go through the motions,
accepting the production of “core documents” from defendants, engaging in
desultory “confirmatory discovery,” then settling for supplemental disclosures
and, of course, attorneys’ fees.60 Because plaintiffs’ lawyers can find a client in
every major transaction,61 cases can be—and are—brought against virtually
every deal.62
C. The Crisis in Shareholder Litigation
The crisis in shareholder litigation is not merely that there is a suit brought
against every deal. Nor is it that shareholders obtain no meaningful relief in
exchange for the release of potentially valuable litigation rights. Nor is it the
“deal tax” imposed upon transacting parties. While these are all aspects of the
crisis, the core problem is that merger litigation is not “litigation” at all.63 Instead,
merger litigation has devolved into a non-adversarial process in which attorneys
on both sides of the “v” extract rents from corporations and their shareholders.
The promise of serious judicial scrutiny over merger transactions has all but
disappeared, replaced instead by a system that ensures a source of revenue for
the corporate bar.
The most commonly cited statistics demonstrating the crisis in shareholder
litigation highlight the frequency of merger litigation. In each year from 2009

57.
See, e.g., Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del Monte Foods Co., 933 F. Supp. 2d
655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
58.
Courtroom victory can only result in dismissal as to the named complainants.
Because the class is never certified, other shareholders are not precluded from raising the same claims.
59.
See Friedlander, supra note 3, at 909 (explaining that the exception may be cases
with a clear potential for monetary recovery, such as controlling shareholder transactions or cases with
clear conflicts of interest).
60.
See Griffith & Rickey, supra note 54 (describing the process).
61.
Plaintiffs’ clients typically come either through a relationship with a public pension
fund plaintiff or through advertising to individual shareholders. See id. (discussing attorney advertising in
the context of merger litigation).
62.
See infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
63.
Cf. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“The system assumes that
adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.”); Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of
ascertaining truth and minimizing risk of error.”).
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through 2015, somewhere between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of all
merger transactions valued at over $100 million attracted litigation, in
comparison with thirty-nine percent a decade ago.64 Preliminary evidence
suggests that lawsuit filings were down somewhat in 2016, yet they are still
roughly twice the historical average.65
The frequency of lawsuit filings, taken on its own, does not necessarily
prove the existence of a crisis. After all, claims must be filed to get access to
discovery, without which prospective litigants cannot know whether they have a
valuable claim. A high frequency of litigation activity may thus merely reflect
the necessary investigatory effort, after which plaintiffs should presumably
pursue strong claims and drop weak ones. However, when the statistics on
litigation frequency are combined with the statistics on outcomes, the crisis
comes into sharp relief. Most merger claims settle,66 but the vast majority of
these settlements provide no monetary recovery to the plaintiff class.67 Instead,
merger claims typically result in nothing more than supplemental disclosures—
so called “disclosure settlements.”68 The shareholders are made to waive their
Revlon claims at settlement along with any conceivable claim arising from the
same underlying facts in exchange for mere words.69 Moreover, any additional
disclosures are typically provided only a few days before the voting deadline,
usually in the form of an SEC filing rather than a document disseminated to all
64.
See Cain & Solomon, supra note 3, at 2.
65.
See Ravi Sinha, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public
Companies, CORNERSTONE RES. 2 (2016), http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports
/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/6RPA-L2HB] (reporting first
half of 2016 statistics showing that merger suits were filed in 64% of all deals worth over $100 million).
66.
Koumrian, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that approximately 70% of merger cases settle
with the rest being dismissed, and finding that 69% of the 565 suits for which the authors could track the
resolution resulted in settlement, while 27% were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs, and 4% were
dismissed with prejudice); Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics
of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 477 (2015) (“[L]itigation with respect to
transactions is dismissed by the court 28.4% of the time. The other 71.6% of transaction litigations result
in some type of settlement.”).
67.
Id. at 10 (reporting that nine out of 190 settlements sampled resulted in payments
to shareholders, while 82% resulted in disclosure-based settlements); id. (“Settlements which only require
disclosure constitute 55.1% of the settlement types in the sample and are the most common type of
settlement.”).
68.
A small fraction of settlements (approximately 13%) resulted in changes to the
merger agreement, most often to the deal-protection provisions, but none of these changes resulted in a
higher bid for the target. Koumrian, supra note 3, at 10 (“Other merger agreement changes included the
terms of top-up option and appraisal rights. Eleven settlements (6%) involved other terms, most often a
delay of the shareholder vote.”). Cases resolved for disclosures alone are sometimes referred to as
“disclosure only” settlements, while cases resolved for disclosures and additional non-pecuniary relief,
such as a reduction in the termination fee, are sometimes referred to as “disclosure plus” settlements. See
Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 586. Here we follow Friedlander in referring to both forms simply as
“disclosure” settlements. See id.
69.
Broad releases can extinguish meaningful claims. For example, In re Rural Metro
Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), which ultimately resulted in a payment of $93 million to the
shareholder class, was first presented to the Court of Chancery as a disclosure settlement. The settlement
was rejected over the objection of other shareholders, but many other such settlements may not attract
motivated objectors. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 26 (“There is no way of knowing how many such cases
are silently extinguished by a release in a prior shareholder suit.”).
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holders, and rarely amounts to the kind of information that would cause a rational
shareholder to reevaluate the transaction.70 And indeed, prior research has found
no evidence of a shareholder response to supplemental disclosures released in
connection with the settlement of merger litigation.71
At the root of the crisis in shareholder litigation is the absence of
meaningful incentives on either side to protect shareholder rights. Plaintiffs’
lawyers seeking disclosure settlements happily trade litigation rights into which
they have invested little, if any, real investigative effort. Meanwhile, defense
counsel, who also collect fees ultimately funded by shareholders, set up the
settlements that result in the abandonment of shareholder rights. The disclosure
settlement dynamic may also lead defense counsel to take a more cavalier
approach to potentially serious conflicts or other complications. In the words of
a prominent member of the Delaware plaintiffs’ bar:
The widespread availability of disclosure settlements created perverse pressures
on transactional counsel and defense counsel. Lawyers for target corporations and
their fiduciaries, financial advisors and purchasers rationally expected that much
M&A litigation can be resolved by means of a disclosure settlement. This
knowledge lessened the influence of transactional counsel to uncover or police
conflicts of interest while a sale process or transaction is pending and to ensure
the prompt, full disclosure of material facts. When litigation began, defense
counsel were incentivized to devote their talents to drafting supplemental
disclosures amenable to a negotiated resolution, and guiding litigation along a
path of least judicial oversight. Successful merits-based litigation by plaintiffs’
counsel empowers transactional counsel to avoid, police, and disclose conflicts
72
of interest. Disclosure settlements do not.

The real crisis in shareholder litigation, in other words, is the collapse of
the adversarial process. Lawyers don’t litigate claims. They negotiate
settlements that not only fail to serve shareholders’ interests, but also fail to deter
managerial misconduct.73
Still, before any settlement can become binding on absent class members,
the law requires a hearing before a judge who is empowered to reject inadequate
or otherwise unfair settlement outcomes.74 But there is no adversarial interest to

70.
See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 566.
71.
See id. (providing an empirical study of shareholder voting patterns in response to
supplemental disclosures and finding no statistically significant shareholder reaction to the release of
supplemental disclosures in connection with the settlement of merger litigation).
72.
See Friedlander, supra note 3, at 882-83.
73.
See Griffith, supra note 3, at 26 (explaining that the “common perception that such
claims lack merit—a view fueled by the high volume of filings and the dearth of significant recoveries—
itself diminishes the reputational impact of being made to defend such a suit”).
74.
Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 951, 968-69 (2014) (“What binds the class is not the agreement between the defendant and the lead
plaintiffs or class counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that agreement. The binding effect
of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood as a function of judicial power.”); William B.
Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435,
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frame the problem for the judge.75 Instead, as described by Fiss in his classic
polemic, Against Settlement, “[t]he contending parties have struck a bargain, and
have every interest in defending the settlement and in convincing the judge that
it is in accord with the law.”76 Or, as Macey and Miller more colorfully described
the problem, settlement hearings are “pep rallies jointly orchestrated by
plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel.”77 Questionable assertions of fact and
law are not scrutinized by opposing counsel. Experts are not cross-examined or
even questioned. And opposing experts are not presented. Instead, judges acting
alone must conduct what amounts to a forensic examination of the proxy
statement to determine whether the settlement disclosures materially altered the
total mix of information available to shareholders.78 It would not be surprising if
many judges, considering their already crowded dockets, decided to skip the
exercise and simply approve the settlement to which the parties have agreed.
Busy judges, deprived of adversarial proceedings, make bad gatekeepers.79
While class action merger litigation is the paradigmatic example of the
crisis in shareholder litigation, derivative suits largely mirror these patterns.80
Derivative suit filings are common and cluster around public events, often a
regulatory investigation, an enforcement action, or a securities filing.81
Settlement patterns are dictated not by the plaintiffs’ investigatory efforts, but by
timing considerations of the underlying enforcement or regulatory action. As
with merger litigation, cases typically settle for non-pecuniary relief and no
monetary recovery to the plaintiffs’ class.82 Only the lawyers get paid. Moreover,
although the process theoretically follows Delaware law, proceedings are often
brought outside of Delaware.83

1444 (2006) (“If class action attorneys sell out their clients, the judge should perceive that the settlement
does not live up to the value of the claims and reject it accordingly. Conversely, if class action attorneys
file a frivolous case, the judge should perceive that the settlement is merely a nuisance payment, reject it
for that reason, and dismiss the case.”).
75.
Griffith, supra note 3, at 21-23 (emphasizing information asymmetries in the
settlement hearing).
76.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1984).
77.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 46 (1991).
78.
Griffith & Rickey, supra note 54.
79.
But see Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377 (2011)
(arguing for a gatekeeping role for judges in settlement).
80.
See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (discussing nuisance suits as suits that settle after little
real litigation activity for a de minimus recovery for the class).
81.
See Stephen J. Choi et al., Piling On? An Empirical Study of Parallel Derivative
Suits (U. Mich. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-001, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703509 [http://perma.cc/2CM5-CTZ5].
82.
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010); Macey & Miller, supra note 77, at 26.
83.
See, e.g., In re Walmart Stores, Inc. Del. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7455-CB, 2016
WL 2908344 (Del. Ch., May 13, 2016) (holding that a Delaware derivative action was precluded by a
dismissal in Arkansas court involving the same underlying facts).
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D. Attempts to Address the Crisis
Recognizing the crisis in shareholder litigation, Delaware has moved to
address it principally through its judiciary. Attempts to respond to the crisis have
included fee shifting bylaws, a heightened standard of review at the fairness
hearing, exclusive forum bylaws, and ultimately the hardening of jurisprudential
attitudes toward shareholder suits. However, none of these attempts has thus far
worked to correct the problem and, worse, the hardening of judicial attitudes
toward shareholder litigation may further damage Delaware’s system of
regulation by litigation by throwing good claims out with the bad.
1. Fee Shifting
The first major effort to address the crisis came when the Delaware
Supreme Court suggested, in its 2014 ruling in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher
Tennis Bund, that corporations could adopt bylaws to shift attorneys’ fees and
litigation costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs.84 Delaware corporations, in other
words, could use bylaw amendments to adopt “loser pays” rules for shareholder
suits.85 Because most shareholder plaintiffs sue in a representative capacity,
forcing the class representative (or her lawyer) to bear the risk of defense-side
legal fees would likely deter most shareholder claimants from filing.86 The ATP
Tour ruling thus represents a potentially promising strategy for quelling the
growth in shareholder litigation.
Precisely for that reason, however, the decision did not stand for long.87
Instead, the Delaware legislature quickly adopted a statutory provision
unambiguously prohibiting any provision that would shift to a shareholder the
corporation’s fees and expenses incurred “in connection with an internal
corporate claim.”88 The reasons for this legislative reversal are explored in
greater detail below.89 For present purposes, it is enough to note that legislation
now precludes a fee shifting strategy to correct the crisis in shareholder
litigation.90

84.
See 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014) (noting the claimant was obligated to pay “all
fees, costs, and expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable
attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses)” of the opposing party in the event that the claimant “does
not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy
sought”).
85.
See infra Section II.D (discussing the indemnity principle in the British and Irish
systems).
86.
Choi, supra note 81.
87.
See infra text accompanying note 376 (discussing the interest group theory).
88.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b); see also id. tit. 8, § 115.
89.
See infra Section III.B.
90.
See, e.g., Solak v. Sarowitz, No. 12299-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 194, at *21-22
(Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2016) (holding that a fee shifting provision, adopted to apply only to extra-forum
litigation filed and maintained in contravention of an exclusive forum provision, nevertheless violated the
ban on fee shifting provisions in § 109(b)).
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2. A Heightened Standard at the Fairness Hearing
After a series of sua sponte settlement rejections criticizing plaintiffs for
providing no meaningful benefit to the shareholder class,91 the Court of
Chancery in In re Trulia clarified that it would apply a heightened standard for
the approval of disclosure settlements.92 Reaffirming the longstanding but
inconsistently applied principle of materiality,93 the Trulia court emphasized that
practitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with
continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a
plainly material misrepresentation or omission . . . . In using the term “plainly
material,” I mean that it should not be a close call that the supplemental
94
information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law.

In applying a high standard of materiality as a condition for the approval of
disclosure settlements, Trulia announced that such settlements are no longer
welcome in Delaware.
Trulia changed litigation patterns in Delaware and across the United States.
As a qualitative matter, Delaware disclosure settlements converted into mootness

91.
See, e.g., In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10765-VCL, slip op.
at 73 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) (denying settlement approval and emphasizing that representation is
inadequate where counsel files litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file in the first place” but
subsequently fails to aggressively litigate when discovery turns up valuable information); In re Riverbed
Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17,
2015) (approving settlement but noting that “[i]f it were not for the reasonable reliance of the parties on
formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of the Class might merit rejection of a settlement
encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved”); Acevedo v.
Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730–VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (rejecting a disclosureonly settlement where plaintiffs settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive disclosures that routinely
show up in these types of settlements”); In re Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 8790-VCL, slip
op. at 15 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “when a fiduciary action
settles, I have to have some confidence that the issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly
when there is going to be a global, expansive, all-encompassing release given”); Rubin v. Obagi Med.
Ptrods., Inc., No. 8433-VCL, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and
noting that “there are unknown unknowns in the world, and the type of global release . . . in this case and
[similar] disclosure settlements provides expansive protection for the defendants against a broad range of
claims, virtually all of which have been completely unexplored by plaintiffs”); In re Medicis Pharm. Corp.
S’holder Litig., No. 7857-CS, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and
noting that “giving out releases lightly is something we’ve got to be careful about”); In re Transatlantic
Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to
approve settlement for lack of any real investigation, disclosure of additional background information,
and in light of the overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction).
92.
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
93.
See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994);
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting standard of TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), that information is material if it significantly alters the total
mix of information available); Chrysler v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966); Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d
343, 345 (Del. 1964).
94.
129 A.3d at 898-99 (emphases added).
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proceedings.95 And quantitatively, Delaware began to see less merger litigation.
This was not because lawyers decided to abandon claims—but because they
decided to pursue them elsewhere. In the fourth quarter of 2015 and first half of
2016, the percentage of litigated deals with claims filed in Delaware fell from
61% to 26%.96 Similarly, in the first half of 2016, complaints involving
Delaware-incorporated targets were filed in Delaware just 36% of the time, down
from 74% in 2015.97 During this same period, merger objection lawsuits filed in
federal court increased substantially.98
The shift of claims to courts in other jurisdictions highlights a fundamental
weakness underlying Trulia in particular, and with the system of regulation by
litigation more generally. Delaware courts can control only what happens in
Delaware. Yet shareholders of a Delaware-incorporated company typically can
bring suit in Delaware, in the state in which the company is headquartered, and
in federal court.99 Even if Delaware substantive law applies to the underlying
claim, there is thus no guarantee that the court in the alternative jurisdiction will
follow Trulia.100 Moreover, considering that neither party to the settlement has
any incentive to instruct the judge in the alternative forum about the existence of
Trulia—much less to encourage the judge to follow it—it is possible that judges
in other jurisdictions will go on approving disclosure settlements without regard
to the decision. Worse, courts in other states may choose not to follow Trulia in

95.
See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL 4146425,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (awarding plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees totaling $50,000 in connection with a
mootness dismissal).
96.
See Sinha, supra note 65, at 3.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. (finding that merger lawsuits filed in federal court increased by 167% in the
second half of 2015); accord Stefan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class
Action Litigation: 2016 Full Year Review, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 4-6 (2017), http://www.nera.com
/publications/archive/2017/recent-trends-in-securities-class-action-litigation--2016-full-y.html
[http://perma.cc/MU3V-XFK4]. The NERA study expressly connects the increase in merger objection
claims in federal court to the increased difficulty in reaching disclosure settlements in state court:
[T]he record number of [federal securities] filings this year was largely attributable to new
merger-objection cases, which numbered 88. The jump likely stemmed from federal
merger-objection suits that would have been filed in other jurisdictions but for various
state-level decisions limiting “disclosure-only” settlements . . . . Mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) activity does not appear to be the primary driver of federal merger-objection case
counts because the number of federal merger-objection filings generally fell between 2010
and 2015, despite increased M&A activity over this period. In 2016, notwithstanding a
13% year-over-year drop in M&A deals targeting US companies, merger-objection suits
doubled from 2015 levels.
Boettrich & Svetlana, supra, at 4.
99.
See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1066-67 (2013).
100.
See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING
TIMES (Steven D. Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2017) (providing a comprehensive analysis of
inter-jurisdictional dynamics in merger cases).
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order to attract litigation to their state.101 Federal district courts, for their part,
have a record both pre- and post-Trulia of approving disclosure settlements,102
but the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, did adopt the Trulia
standard for review of disclosure settlements.103 It remains to be seen, however,
what other federal courts will do. The one thing that is clear, however, is that
Delaware courts have literally lost control of the problem.
3. Exclusive Forum Bylaws
Delaware responded to the movement of corporate law litigation to other
jurisdictions by explicitly endorsing exclusive forum bylaws—first in judicial
rulings, then by statute.104 Companies can specify Delaware as the exclusive
forum for intra-corporate litigation and then move for the dismissal of litigation
in the alternative forum as a violation of the exclusive forum provision.105
However, it now appears that exclusive forum provisions will not solve the crisis
in shareholder litigation. The reason, essentially, is that the provision is not selfenforcing. Because defendants retain discretion over whether to invoke the
provision, and because defendants have strong incentives to settle merger claims
for disclosures or other insubstantial relief, exclusive forum provisions are
unlikely to bring merger litigation back to Delaware where, post-Trulia, it is
harder to settle a case for disclosures.106
Defense counsel have been remarkably forthright in counseling clients on
preserving their settlement options. As explained by one prominent law firm:
[A] company may wish to . . . adopt the bylaws now and then eliminate them if it
becomes clear that other jurisdictions will continue to approve disclosure-only
settlements. Further, a company may wish to adopt the bylaws and then waive
them in the context of an approved transaction when the company would prefer

101.
See, e.g., Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 159 (2017)
(reversing the trial court decision and adopting a standard of “some benefit” for disclosure settlements in
the face of Delaware’s plainly material standard).
102.
See In re Meadowbrook Ins. Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5:15-CV-10497-JCORSW, 2016 WL 8200510 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2016); Leitz v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-262HEH, 2016 WL 1043021 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2016); McGill v. Hake, No. 1:15-cv-00217-TWP-DKL, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22440 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2016); Li v. Bowers, 1:15-cv-373 (M.D. N.C., Mar. 22,
2016); Taxman v. Covidien, No. 1:14-cv-12949 (D. Mass., Sept. 21, 2015).
103.
See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016).
104.
See City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 242 (Del.
Ch. 2014); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 936 (Del. Ch. 2013); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (authorizing the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of a Delaware
corporation to include a forum selection clause requiring that lawsuits asserting “internal corporate
claims,” including derivative actions, be brought solely and exclusively in the Delaware courts).
105.
See, e.g., Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Or. 2015) (en
banc) (recognizing the validity of the exclusive forum provision).
106.
See supra Section I.D.2.
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the certainty of a quick resolution over the prospect of lengthier litigation for
107
vindication on the merits.

There is at least one example of a case settling for non-pecuniary relief in
an alternative jurisdiction expressly to avoid Delaware.108 However, looking
only at companies that settled in an alternative forum in spite of a previously
adopted exclusive forum provision likely underrepresents the full extent of the
problem because firms can adopt exclusive forum provisions without
shareholder approval at virtually any time.109 Every firm should thus be regarded
as having the provision in place. In light of this, the fact that there are many
disclosure settlements outside of Delaware post-Trulia can only mean that such
outcomes are a revealed preference of defendants.
4. The Hardening of Jurisprudential Standards
Finally, Delaware courts have reacted to the crisis in shareholder litigation
through a series of discernable shifts in the underlying jurisprudential standards.

107.
See Delaware’s Effort to Reduce Wasteful M&A Litigation, FRIED FRANK 5 (Feb.
9,
2016),
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Final%20-2-9-2016-MA%20BriefingTrulia.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TEF-ZU97].
108.
The case is the CytRx derivative litigation filed both in Delaware and in federal
court in California, where rather than enforcing its exclusive forum provision in favor of Delaware, the
defendant asked a California federal court to set aside a prior dismissal of the case in order to settle there.
However, the court refused, noting that it was
skeptical of the Parties’ motivation for attempting to settle here. The Delaware Court of
Chancery has gained a reputation for rejecting shareholder class action and derivative
settlements that do not have a monetary component yet include a broad release of claims
and an award of attorneys’ fees, similar to the proposed settlement here . . . . It is reasonable
to infer that a motivation for seeking vacatur may be to avoid a forum that reviews critically
the general type of settlement proposed by the Parties here. This inference is made all the
more reasonable by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s recent failure to receive approval of a nonmonetary settlement in the Chancery Court. We cannot ignore the possibility that the
current Motion may be an attempt to shop for a more hospitable forum in which to settle
the dispute.
In re CytRx Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., CV-14-6414-GHK-PJW, slip op. at 7-9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17,
2016).
109.
The problem is analogous to measuring takeover defenses by looking only at firms
that have adopted poison pills. As with the poison pill, forum selection bylaws are adopted by unilateral
board action. Thus, surveying the number of firms that have adopted the provision fails to count those
firms that could have the provision at their disposal in a moment’s notice—as soon as the company
receives a hostile bid, in the case of a poison pill, or as soon as the company signs a merger agreement or
engages in other transactions likely to lead to shareholder suits, in the case of a forum selection bylaw. In
the same way that every Delaware company has a “shadow” pill, so every Delaware company should also
be regarded as having a “shadow” exclusive forum provision. See John C. Coates, Takeover Defenses in
the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000); see also
Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 16-33, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2836223 [http://perma.cc/PSE8EJ53].
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Earlier Delaware cases expressed skepticism of single-bidder auctions,110
subjected stringent deal protections to rigorous scrutiny,111 and invalidated
contracts made in violation of fiduciary duty.112 More recent Delaware
jurisprudence, however, tolerates single-bidder merger processes, accepts noshop provisions and other deal protections as routine, places greater emphasis on
the contractual rights of bidders, demonstrates a reluctance to issue injunctions,
and defers to the stockholder vote as the principal check on deal practice.113
Although there are several possible reasons for these shifts—including director
independence, the de-staggering of boards, and greater involvement of
institutional and activist investors—one possible cause is the recognition that
older jurisprudential standards may have led to, or at least failed to prevent, the
crisis in shareholder litigation.114
The watering down of jurisprudential standards in response to the crisis in
shareholder litigation implies a failure to distinguish good and bad claims and,
ultimately, a failure to police managerial misconduct.115 The substantive changes
described above suggest less protection for shareholders even in the case of
genuine managerial failures. Foreclosing litigation in such cases may, in a system
of regulation by litigation, pave the way for more self-serving transactions by
management and an overall reduction in shareholder welfare.
II. Administrative Regulation and the Anglo-Irish Alternative
In 1887, Oscar Wilde, an Irishman, wrote that the English “have really
everything in common with America nowadays, except, of course, language.”116
If he were alive today, he might have added, “and merger regulation.” In spite of
the strong cultural affinities between British, Irish, and American societies and

110.
See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (“A decent
respect for reality forces one to admit that . . . advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale
substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant market can provide.”).
111.
See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del.
1994) (“[T]he Paramount Board clearly gave insufficient attention to the potential consequences of the
defensive measures demanded by Viacom.”).
112.
Id. at 51 (finding that a sophisticated contracting party “cannot be now heard to
argue that it obtained vested contract rights by negotiating and obtaining contractual provisions from a
board acting in violation of its fiduciary duties”).
113.
See J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of
Evolution in Delaware M&A Litigation 27 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (analyzing the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in C & J Energy Services, Inc. v. Miami General Employees’ &
Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014), as a paradigmatic example of this
shift).
114.
Id. at 44-47 (documenting “the avalanche of lawsuits produc[ing] comparably
minimal value for stockholders”); accord Joel E. Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data
Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform 45-51 (U. Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 17-1, 2016) (criticizing the expansion of the business judgment rule as a means of
controlling nuisance litigation).
115.
See id. at 51 (warning that overzealous application of the business judgment rule
“creates an incentive for controllers to commit fraud”).
116.
OSCAR WILDE, THE CANTERVILLE GHOST 6 (2011).
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the deep structural similarities between their legal and economic institutions—
common law legal systems, developed stock markets, dispersed ownership, and
active takeover markets117—these countries have chosen two sharply divergent
approaches to regulating merger activity.118 While the United States has
steadfastly pursued a system of regulation by litigation, the United Kingdom and
Ireland have successfully experimented with a system based around expert
panels of market professionals applying codified bodies of rules that govern
transactions as they unfold. These code and panel-based regimes have largely
supplanted litigation in the context of public takeover bids. In the Anglo-Irish
system, takeover panels effectively preside over what in the United States are the
core preoccupations of judges in merger suits: the conduct of the sale process,
the adequacy of disclosure to shareholders, and the permissible role of the target
board in responding to takeover bids.
This Part describes the core features of the Anglo-Irish model of merger
regulation. It frames the important differences between this model and the U.S.
system of regulation by litigation as a function of divergent institutional interests
and structural constraints operating on either side of the Atlantic. These code and
panel-based regimes, along with a concomitant set of procedural rules
discouraging entrepreneurial litigation, work to constrain the development of
shareholder litigation while still protecting shareholder rights in merger
transactions.
A. The Emergence of Anglo-Irish Takeover Regulation
The approach to merger regulation in the United Kingdom and Ireland grew
out of a longstanding tradition of self-regulation in financial markets. The
preference for self-regulation implied a particular model of regulation. Because
both government intervention and the imposition of jurisprudential standards are
antithetical to self-regulatory norms, the Anglo-Irish system adopted a system
whereby expert panels of market participants wrote, interpreted, and enforced a
set of rules agreed among the participants themselves. The development of this
system is described in greater detail below.
Public takeover bids appeared in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s.
These first bids reflected the confluence of several factors, including post-war
inflation on real estate and other fixed assets, dividend restrictions on public
companies, and improvements in financial reporting.119 The emergence of public
117.
See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (reviewing the economic and legal
similarities between the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland).
118.
See Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, supra note 7, at 225 (describing the
different policy choices of the United States and United Kingdom in the area of mergers, acquisitions and
other control transactions).
119.
See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed
and Emerging Markets, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 233 (2011); Les Hannah, Takeover Bids in Britain
Before 1950: An Exercise in Business ‘Pre-History,’ 16 BUS. HIST. 65 (1974); Andrew Johnston,
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takeover bids during the 1950s and 1960s represented a clear threat to the
directors and management of target companies. Target boards responded with a
range of defensive tactics. High profile examples include the takeover contests
for the Savoy Hotel and British Aluminium.120
In the contest for the Savoy, the bidder sought to acquire the target in order
to convert one of its flagship properties, The Berkeley Hotel, into commercial
offices.121 The target board responded with a classic “lock-up” defense:
transferring ownership of The Berkeley to a shell corporation whose voting
shares were then allotted to the trustees of the Savoy’s employee pension fund,
one of whom was the chairman of the target board. This strategy proved highly
controversial, with many Savoy shareholders viewing it as depriving them of
their right to consider the bid on its merits. This view was subsequently affirmed
by the U.K. Board of Trade,122 which issued a report concluding that the board’s
actions were invalid as they had the effect of irrevocably denying any future
owner of the ability to sell or alter the use of The Berkeley.123
The contest for British Aluminium was even more controversial.124 The
controversy began when two prospective bidders privately approached the target
board: one a partnership between Tube Investments and Reynolds Metal
Company (“TI-Reynolds”), the other the Aluminum Company of America
(“Alcoa”). Without publicly disclosing either approach, the board rejected the
TI-Reynolds bid and agreed to a deal that involved the issuance of a significant
number of new shares to Alcoa.125 When it became clear that TI-Reynolds
planned to make a direct offer to shareholders, the target board then disclosed
the earlier approaches and sought to secure shareholder approval for the Alcoa
deal by increasing the firm’s dividend.126 The revelation of the board’s decision
to issue a block of new and undervalued shares to Alcoa attracted significant
opprobrium from shareholders, many of whom sold out to TI-Reynolds.127
Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422,
426-27 (2007).
120.
See generally Richard Roberts, Regulatory Responses to the Rise of the Market for
Corporate Control in Britain in the 1950s, 34 BUS. HIST. 183, 187 (1992) (describing the early English
jurisprudence arising in connection with the emergence of public takeover bids).
121.
See Laurence C.B. Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1955) (providing a more detailed description of the takeover contest for the Savoy).
122.
The Board of Trade was the predecessor to the current Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy.
123.
See BD. OF TRADE, THE SAVOY HOTEL LIMITED AND THE BERKELEY HOTEL
COMPANY LIMITED: INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 165(B) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1948: REPORT OF
EDWARD M. HOLLAND, Q.C. (1954).
124.
For a more detailed description of the takeover contest for British Aluminium, see
Armour et al., supra note 119, at 235; and John Armour & David A. Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for
Hostile Takeovers and Why?: The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J.
1727, 1758 (2007).
125.
See Battle for British Aluminium, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1958, at 913.
126.
See Statement of the British Aluminium Board, TIMES LONDON, Dec. 6, 1958, at
11; British Aluminium Reveals Contract with Alcoa, TIMES LONDON, Nov. 29, 1958, at 12.
127.
See British Aluminium: A Reply Under Pressure, ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1958;
Letters to the Editor, TIMES LONDON, Dec. 11, 1958; Letters to the Editor, TIMES LONDON, Jan. 9, 1959.
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Indeed, the shareholder reaction to the board’s conduct was so powerful that a
number of other public companies committed not to issue new shares without
prior shareholder approval.128
The controversies surrounding the takeover contests for the Savoy and
British Aluminium provoked widespread calls for regulation prescribing the
range of actions that target boards would be permitted to take in response to
takeover bids.129 In July 1959, the Bank of England responded by convening a
committee representing large commercial banks, merchant banks, and
institutional investors, along with the London Stock Exchange, to draft a set of
rules governing the conduct of takeover bids.130 The result was the Notes on
Amalgamation of British Businesses (“Notes”), a series of principles,
supplemented by procedural rules, “concerned primarily to safeguard the
interests of shareholders.”131 These principles emphasized, for example, that
there should be no interference in the free market for shares, that shareholders
should receive sufficient information, and that it was up to shareholders—not the
target board—to decide on the merits of a bid.132 The obligation of the target
board to provide information to shareholders represented a significant change
from the common law position, which did not require the board to provide
information to assist shareholders in evaluating the bid.133 The Notes are thus
credited with articulating the basic principle of shareholder primacy that survives
in the United Kingdom to this day.134
Ultimately, the Notes proved less than successful as a mechanism for
constraining abuse within the U.K. takeover market. As a preliminary matter, the
principles provided by the Notes were often extremely vague: suggesting, for
example, that “every effort” should be made to avoid market disturbance, that
shareholders should be given “adequate time (say three weeks)” for accepting an
offer, and that it was “desirable” that the offer be made for all of the target’s
outstanding shares.135 Perhaps more importantly, there was no oversight body
responsible for monitoring or enforcing compliance with the Notes.136
By the late 1960s, the use of defensive tactics—combined with the relative
impotence of the Notes—was also beginning to provoke shareholder litigation.

128.
British Aluminium Reply, TIMES LONDON, Dec. 20, 1958, at 9.
129.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1758; Armour et al., supra note 119, at
236; David Kershaw, Corporate Law and Self-Regulation 12 (London Sch. of Econ. Law, Soc’y & Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
05/2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574201
[http://perma.cc/4YS4-MXLD].
130.
See LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 568 (2015); Armour et al., supra note 119, at 236.
131.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1759.
132.
See Johnston, supra note 119, at 432.
133.
See In Re Evertite Locknuts Ltd., [1945] Ch D 220 (UK).
134.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1759.
135.
See Kershaw, supra note 129, at 13.
136.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1759.
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The leading case from this period is Hogg v. Cramphorn.137 Citing a long line of
precedents, the court held that the defensive tactics in question were voidable
because their primary purpose was to thwart a potential takeover bid. The court’s
reasoning in Hogg thus echoed the “sole or primary purpose” test enunciated in
Cheff v. Mathes,138 decided in Delaware at approximately the same time.139
Importantly, like Cheff v. Mathes, the test in Hogg necessitated a fact-driven
investigation into the board’s motives for adopting defensive tactics. From the
perspective of bidders and target shareholders, therefore, applying to a court for
relief was likely to be a time consuming, costly, and uncertain process.140
The influence of Hogg as a precedent for future cases was largely
forestalled by the introduction of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“City
Code”).141 The introduction of the City Code is generally viewed as a response
to two related threats to the City’s shareholder-friendly reputation. The first was
the threat of government intervention following a spate of high profile takeover
disputes in the late 1960s. These disputes reinforced the perception that the Notes
were an ineffective mechanism for constraining abusive conduct and
practices.142 The second was the delay and uncertainty associated with the
common law approach to the resolution of these disputes as embodied by the
court’s decision in Hogg.143 For the second time in less than a decade, the Bank
of England responded by convening a committee of bankers, institutional
investors, and other market participants. On March 28, 1968, the committee
unveiled the new City Code: a collection of ten general principles supplemented
by thirty-five more detailed rules governing the U.K. public takeover market.
Like its predecessor, the City Code was drafted by market participants concerned
primarily with protecting the interests of target shareholders. The key difference
in terms of the effectiveness of the City Code relative to the Notes was the
creation of the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.144
The United Kingdom’s decision to adopt a self-regulatory code and panelbased takeover regime can be attributed to two principal factors. The first was

137.
Hogg v. Cramphorn, [1967] 1 Ch 254, 266-67 (UK) (citing Piercy v. Mills, [1920]
1 Ch. 77 (UK), and Fraser v. Whalley (1864) 71 Eng. Rep. 361; 2 H & M 10).
138.
199 A.2d 548 (Del. Ch. 1964).
139.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
140.
See Johnston, supra note 119, at 436.
141.
PANEL ON TAKEOVERS & MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE 2016 [hereinafter City
Code]; Johnston, supra note 119, at 441. This is not to suggest that the introduction of the City Code
completely forestalled the development of subsequent case law in this area. See Criterion Props. plc v.
Stratford Props. UK plc, [2004] UKHL 28, 1 W.L.R. 2108; Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum, [1974]
AC 821 (PC).
142.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1759; Kershaw, supra note 129, at 16.
This threat was notably framed in terms of the creation of a British Securities and Exchange Commission.
See The Case for a British SEC, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1967; Back to the Jungle, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1967.
143.
See Johnston, supra note 119, at 442-44.
144.
See John Armour et al., A Comparative Analysis of Hostile Takeover Regimes in
the US, UK and Japan (with Implications for Emerging Markets) 18 (Colum. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 377), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657953 [http://perma.cc/R7FM-WRJJ].
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the United Kingdom’s longstanding tradition of self-regulation.145 Perhaps
nowhere has this tradition been more observable than in connection with the
regulation of financial markets.146 Indeed, before the dramatic structural changes
introduced by the so-called “Big Bang”147 and the enactment of the Financial
Services Act of 1986,148 the United Kingdom relied almost exclusively on
market participants, customary understandings, and moral suasion on the part of
the Bank of England as sources of financial regulation. The second factor was
the influence of institutional shareholders. Insurance companies, pension funds,
and other institutional investors began accumulating significant stakes in U.K.
public companies long before the same trend emerged in the United States.
Between 1957 and 1969, the percentage of U.K. share ownership by institutional
investors more than doubled from under 20% to approximately 45%.149 As
demonstrated by the impact of their rebuke of the board’s conduct in the takeover
contest for British Aluminum, along with their subsequent role in the
development of the Notes and City Code, the rise of institutional shareholders in
the United Kingdom enabled them to exert coordinated influence over the
regulatory environment in which public companies operated.150 As these
shareholders began to perceive that common law courts would prove too slow,
too unpredictable, and potentially afford inadequate protection to their interests,
they found themselves in an advantageous position to leverage this influence to
shape the substantive obligations enshrined in the City Code. Importantly, the
speed, certainty, and level of protection that institutional shareholders desired
also suggested a particular mode of merger regulation: an expert panel
responsible for writing, interpreting, and enforcing a set of detailed rules, in real
time, and with limited recourse to courts.
The U.K. Takeover Panel operated as a self-regulatory body until 2006,151
when the Companies Act of 2006 codified the City Code and provided the U.K.
145.
See Rob Baggot, Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of SelfRegulation, 67 PUB. ADMIN. 435, 442-43 (1989).
146.
BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 36566 (1997); LAURENCE GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (1982).
147.
“Big Bang” (never “the Big Bang”) refers to the October 27, 1986 restructuring of
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Formerly a private and autonomous association, Big Bang brought
the LSE within the scope of the Financial Services Act 1986, abolished minimum commissions, and
eliminated the longstanding distinction between stockbrokers and stockjobbers. Big Bang also saw the
removal of restrictions respecting the organization and ownership of LSE member firms, thus facilitating
the acquisition of significant interests in members by other financial intermediaries for the first time.
148.
Financial Services Act 1986, c. 60 (UK).
149.
Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1769.
150.
See G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, at chs. 3, 4, 5 (1996); Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1793-94; Bernard S. Black &
John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 1997, 2035-36 (1994).
151.
In 2006, the United Kingdom implemented the European Union Takeover
Directive, which was in large part modeled on the City Code. Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. Ultimately, the
United Kingdom provided statutory underpinning for the U.K. Panel in order to ensure full
implementation of the Takeover Directive. See Blanaid Clarke, The Takeovers Directive: Is a Little
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Panel with a range of formal powers.152 Today, the City Code is organized
around six General Principles,153 thirty-eight rules, and comments providing
guidance on each rule. The notes are of considerable importance and, in many
cases, are treated as prescriptive by the Panel.154 The City Code applies to all
offers made for companies that have their registered office in the United
Kingdom whose securities have been admitted for trading on a regulated market
or multilateral trading facility in the United Kingdom.155 The primary purpose of
the City Code is to ensure that target shareholders are treated fairly, afforded
equivalent treatment by bidders, and not denied an opportunity to decide on the
merits of a bid. Ultimately, however, neither the City Code nor the U.K. Panel
are concerned with value judgments as to the merits of a bid.
In Ireland, the U.K. Panel regulated takeover offers for registered
companies until 1997. In response to incoming EU legislation, the Irish Stock
Exchange withdrew from the International Stock Exchange of the United
Kingdom and Republic of Ireland in 1995. As a result, the continued oversight
of Irish listed companies by the U.K. Panel was no longer appropriate. However,
the Irish experience with the U.K. Panel had been very positive. As such, there
was a preference to retain a self-regulatory system modeled on the U.K. Panel.
At the same time, it was felt that statutory powers were required in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the new regime. The Irish Panel was thus established
as a statutory body pursuant to the Irish Takeover Panel Act of 1997 (“Takeover
Act”).156
The Irish Panel regulates the conduct of takeovers of Irish registered
companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, New
York Stock Exchange, or Nasdaq (“relevant companies”).157 The inclusion of
companies listed on U.S. exchanges has meant that approximately one-quarter
of the eighty companies overseen by the panel are former U.S. companies that
Regulation Better Than No Regulation?, 15 EUR. L.J. 174, 177 (2009); Blanaid Clarke, Takeover
Regulation: Through the Regulatory Looking Glass 6 (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ.,
Research Paper No. 18/2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002675 [http://perma.cc/M5CV-RN9E].
152.
Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 954 (UK).
153.
These five General Principles are the same principles that are set out in Article 3
of the Directive.
154.
The Appendices contain more detailed guidance notes on specific issues such as
mandatory bid waivers and auction procedures. Thirty practice statements on controversial issues such as
shareholder activism and irrevocable undertakings are also appended to the Code.
155.
City Code, supra note 141, § 3(a)(i), at A3. The City Code also applies to certain
offers where: (i) the takeover panel considers the target firm as having its central management and control
in the United Kingdom, id. § 3(a)(ii)), or (ii) the United Kingdom shares jurisdiction with another
jurisdiction in the European Economic Area, id. § 3(a)(iii). The City Code also applies to certain
companies supervised by the U.K. Panel by virtue of Article 4 of the E.U. Takeover Directive.
156.
Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 (Act No. 5/1997) (Ir.), http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997/act/5/enacted/en/html [http://perma.cc/Z9NK-LFMC] [hereinafter
1997 Takeover Panel Act]; see also BLANAID CLARKE, TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS LAW IN IRELAND, at
ch. 3 (1999) (providing a description of the background to the introduction of the 1997 Takeover Panel
Act).
157.
The Irish Panel may also be responsible for supervising certain other EU
companies by virtue of Article 4(2) of the EU Takeover Bids Directive 2004/25/EC.
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have undergone corporate inversions or restructurings. The ownership of these
companies tends to be dominated by foreign shareholders, with the management
and lead advisers in connection with any takeover also likely to be from outside
Ireland. Between July 2012 and June 2016, six of the thirteen takeovers
supervised by the Irish Panel involved U.S. listed companies.158 Although Irish
law applies to these transactions, the U.S. listings, large U.S. shareholder bases,
and the residency of many of the principal parties have ensured that the SEC and
U.S. courts have also played a role in these transactions.
The Takeover Act sets out seven General Principles applicable to the
conduct of takeovers, the first six of which are identical to those contained in the
City Code.159 The Irish Rules promulgated under the Takeover Act are similarly
based substantially on those in the United Kingdom.160 While not a selfregulatory body, the Takeover Act imbues the Irish Panel with significant
flexibility, allowing it, for example, to waive or derogate from any of the Irish
Rules in exceptional circumstances.161 Although most of the initial differences
with the City Code could be attributed to the statutory nature of the Irish Rules,
a small number of disparities have since arisen in the regulation of various issues.
Ultimately, however, the objectives of the Irish Rules are the same as those of
the City Code,162 and neither the Irish Rules nor Panel are concerned with the
merits of a bid.
B. The City Code and the Irish Rules
In the United States, bidders enjoy a great deal of freedom in the context of
public takeover bids. Target companies are likewise free to erect procedural
barriers to these bids, subject only to the board’s fiduciary duties and the
requirement that takeover defenses be “reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.”163 The City Code and Irish Rules, in contrast, add to these fiduciary
duties prescriptive rules governing almost every aspect of the conduct of both
bidders and target companies. These rules prescribe, among other matters: the
timetable for bids; the content of announcements, offering documents, and
management circulars; restrictions on dealing in target shares; the nature of bid
consideration; the use of conditional bids; agreements with target management;
the circumstances in which target boards will be required to seek independent
advice; and the role and duties of financial advisers.

158.
See Annual Reports 2012-2017, IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL App. 2,
http://irishtakeoverpanel.ie/about/annual-reports [http://perma.cc/H9TY-PSVV].
159.
City Code, supra note 141, General Princ., at B1. The seventh principle regulates
substantial acquisitions of securities which are no longer regulated by the U.K. Panel.
160.
IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL, TAKEOVER RULES AND SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION
RULES, 2013, (Ir.) [hereinafter Irish Rules].
161.
1997 Takeover Panel Act, supra note 156, § 8(7).
162.
Irish Rules, supra note 160, Intro., at 1.
163.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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From the perspective of our comparison with the U.S. model of regulation
by litigation, four sets of rules stand out as particularly important. The first
relates to the timetable of the offer, which is strictly regulated in the United
Kingdom and Ireland. Once a bidder has announced a firm intention to make an
offer, in general, it must post a formal offer to shareholders within twenty-eight
days164 and have the offer accepted within a further sixty days.165
The second important set of rules relates to the financial and other
information that bidders and target boards are required to provide target
shareholders. General Principle 2 states that “[t]he holders of the securities of an
offeree company must have sufficient time and information to enable them to
reach a properly informed decision on the bid.”166 This principle is fleshed out
by a series of more detailed rules identifying the information that must be
provided to shareholders. Information that must be disclosed by the bidder
includes audited accounts; strategic plans for the target firm; the bidder’s
intentions with regard to the target’s business, employees, and pension
schemes;167 a description of the relevant financing arrangements; and any
interests or dealings of the bidder, its directors, or those acting in concert in the
securities of the target.168 Target boards, meanwhile, are required to provide
shareholders with a circular setting out the board’s opinion on the bid, including
its views on the impact of the proposed merger on the firm’s interests,
employment, and the location of the firm’s place of business. All information
tendered by a bidder or target must be made equally available to all shareholders
as nearly as possible to the same time and in the same manner.169 These detailed
requirements are then augmented by a more general duty on bidders, target
boards, and their advisers to ensure that each document, announcement,
statement, or other information released during the course of a bid complies with
the highest standards of care and accuracy.170 Further, all documents and
advertisements published in connection with the offer must contain statements
to the effect that the directors of the bidder or target (as applicable) accept
responsibility for the information contained therein and that it is, to the best of
their knowledge, accurate and complete.171

9.2.
9.4.
23, at 7.3.

6.10.

164.

City Code, supra note 141, r. 24.1, at J2; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 30.2(a), at

165.

City Code, supra note 141, r. 31.6, at N3; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 31.4, at

166.

City Code, supra note 141, General Princ., at B1; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r.

167.
168.
169.

The Irish Rules do not explicitly refer to pensions.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 24, at J2; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 24, at 7.4.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 20.1, at I9; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 20.1(a), at

170.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 19.1, at I1; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 19.1, at 6.2
(helping to avoid acrimonious disputes between the parties, as only where a statement is expressly stated
to be an opinion may it be included without verification and a statement of source).
171.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 19.2, at I2; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 19.2, at
6.2.
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The third set of rules impose significant constraints on the range of actions
that target boards can take in response to a takeover bid. The most important of
these constraints—especially in comparison with the position in the United
States—is the “no frustration” rule. General Principle 3 states that “[t]he board
of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and
must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of
the bid.”172 Rule 21 gives effect to this principle by prohibiting target boards
from taking any action that may result in the frustration of a bid, or deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to decide on its merits, without first obtaining
shareholder approval.173 This prohibition encompasses (but is not limited to) the
creation or issuance of shares, options, or other rights in connection with the
target’s shares (e.g. “poison pills”), the acquisition or disposal of material assets
(e.g. “lock up” defenses), and the entering into of any contract other than in the
ordinary course of business.174 Following Kraft’s successful takeover bid for
Cadbury in 2011, the scope of the prohibition in the City Code was expanded to
include, subject to very narrow exceptions, break fees, inducement fees, and
other deal protection measures.175 In Ireland, such potentially defensive
measures are still permitted subject to panel consent.176 In marked contrast with
the United States, the role of target boards in defending against a takeover bid is
thus limited to the identification of potential alternative bidders—so called
“white knights”—and to persuading shareholders that the bid does not fully
reflect the value of the firm. Perhaps most importantly for the present purposes,
the no frustration principle substitutes a bright line rule constraining defensive
action for the fact-driven common law test articulated in Hogg.177
The City Code’s prohibition against frustrating action is also reflected in
the U.K. Panel’s approach toward tactical litigation. The U.K. Panel has referred
to tactical litigation for the purposes of preventing a bid from being considered
on its merits as “highly undesirable and potentially gravely damaging to the
orderly conduct of bids” 178 and something the shareholders should have an
opportunity to consider and vote upon at a general meeting. It is presently not
clear whether the Irish Panel would adopt a similar approach to tactical litigation.
172.
City Code, supra note 141, General Princ. 3, at B1.
173.
Id. R. 21.1(a), at I18; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 21.1(a), at 6.14.
174.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 21.1(b), at I18; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 21.1(a),
at 6.14 (explaining that the panel may consent to an otherwise restricted action if the action relates to a
pre-existing obligation, or if a decision to take the proposed action was taken before the offer was
imminent and that decision has either been partly or fully implemented or is in the ordinary course of
business).
175.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 21.2, at I21.
176.
Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 21, at 6.14-15 (explaining that consent will generally
only be given in connection with arrangements covering specific quantifiable third party costs, subject to
an upper limit of one percent of the value of the bid and confirmation by the target’s financial adviser that
the arrangement is in the shareholders’ best interests).
177.
See TAKEOVER PANEL, CONSOLIDATED GOLD FIELDS PLC, 1989, at 9 (UK)
(acknowledging and disapproving of the use of tactical litigation itself as a defensive tactic).
178.
Id.
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On the one hand, preventing a board from taking legal action might be viewed
as a breach of the company’s constitutional right to access to the courts.179 On
the other hand, Rule 21 does not represent an outright prohibition against
frustrating action, but simply a requirement that shareholder approval be
obtained before any action is taken.
The prohibition against frustrating action is only triggered during the course
of an offer or at any earlier time at which the board has reason to believe that a
bona fide offer may be imminent.180 However, even where no bid is imminent,
target boards in the United Kingdom and Ireland still face a number of significant
constraints on their ability to proactively implement defensive measures. Under
the U.K. Companies Act 2006 and Irish Companies Act 2014, for example, the
issuance of new shares necessary to implement a poison pill would require
shareholder authorization.181 Shareholders also possess the mandatory right to
remove directors by ordinary resolution, thereby rendering staggered boards an
ineffective entrenchment mechanism.182 In theory, of course, defensive action
might also constitute a breach of the directors’ duties to act in the interests of the
company183 and to exercise their powers for proper purpose.184
The prohibition against frustrating action places severe constraints on the
ability of a target board to take any actions in response to a takeover bid that
might conflict with the interests of shareholders. This prohibition is
supplemented by a fourth set of rules dealing more specifically with conflicts of
interest. Rule 3.1 requires a target company to obtain independent advice
regarding whether the financial terms of any offer are fair and reasonable and to
disclose this advice to shareholders.185 Rule 3.2 imposes an equivalent obligation
on bidders in the context of reserve takeovers or where the directors face a
conflict of interest.186 The financial advisers providing this advice must similarly
not have a significant interest in, or connection with, either the bidder or target

179.
McCauley v. Minister for Posts & Teles. [1966] IR 345 (Ir.) (recognizing that
companies have this right).
180.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 21.1, at I18; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 21.1, at
6.14.
181.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, §§ 549-551; Companies Act 2014
(Act No. 38/2014), § 1021 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/act/38/enacted/en/html
[http://perma.cc/PC3Z-MCJM] [hereinafter Companies Act 2014].
182.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 168; Companies Act 2014, supra
note 181, § 146.
183.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 172(1); Companies Act 2014, supra
note 181, § 228(1)(a).
184.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 171; Companies Act 2014, supra
note 181, § 228(1)(c).
185.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 3.1, at D21; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 3.1, at
1.13 (referring only to “advice on [the] offer”).
186.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 3.2, at D21-22; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 3.2, at
1.13 (noting that a conflict of interest will exist for these purposes “for instance, when there are significant
cross-shareholdings between an offeror and the offeree company, when there are a number of directors
common to both companies or when a person has a substantial interest in both companies”).
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company that would create a conflict of interest.187 Finally, where a member of
the target board has a conflict of interest, that director should not normally join
the remainder of the board in the expression of its views on the bid as part of the
management circular.188 The nature of the conflict to be clearly explained to
shareholders.189
C. The Takeover Panels
Introduced alongside the City Code, the U.K. Takeover Panel serves two
key functions. The first is broadly legislative: writing, periodically reviewing,
and updating the City Code.190 The second is essentially judicial: giving
guidance and rulings on the interpretation, application, and effect of the City
Code’s principles, rules, and notices.191 The U.K. Panel also monitors
compliance with the City Code and investigates and enforces potential breaches.
In furtherance of its rulemaking, investigatory, and enforcement functions, the
U.K. Panel is empowered by statute to “do anything that it considers necessary
or expedient.”192 This includes the power to compel disclosure of information,
impose sanctions, and apply to a court to enforce compliance with the City
Code.193
Responsibility for the U.K. Panel’s legislative function rests with the
panel’s Code Committee.194 The Code Committee is composed of
representatives drawn from the panel’s membership of institutional shareholders,
corporate executives, legal and financial advisers, and other stakeholder
groups.195 The committee meets several times a year to discuss market
developments and determine whether any amendments to the City Code are
necessary.196 In most cases, the committee will undertake a consultative process
akin to the SEC’s notice and comment period soliciting the views of interested
stakeholders in connection with any proposed amendments. In exceptional cases,
the committee may also amend the City Code without prior consultation where

187.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 3.3, at D22; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r. 3.3, at
1.14 (noting that advisers may be disqualified on the basis of a conflict by arrangements–such as success
fees–contingent on the failure of a bid).
188.
City Code, supra note 141, r. 25.2, at J17 n.4; Irish Rules, supra note 160, r.
3.1(a)(ii), at 1.13.
189.
Id.
190.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, §§ 943-44.
191.
Id. § 945.
192.
Id. § 942(2).
193.
Id. §§ 947, 952, 955.
194.
City Code, supra note 141, § 4(b), at A9 (UK).
195.
Id.
196.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1749; see also Annual Reports (20122016), TAKEOVER PANEL http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/reports [http://perma.cc
/FY4A-2TUY] (noting that between 2012 and 2016, the Code Committee met four to five times per year
on average).
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an expedited response to market developments is deemed necessary and
appropriate.197
Frontline responsibility for the U.K. Panel’s judicial function rests with its
executive. The executive is staffed by a mix of fulltime employees and
professionals on secondment from law firms, investment banks, and other City
institutions.198 For each deal, the panel will assign a case officer to oversee the
bid process.199 The parties will then be required to liaise with the case officer on
a regular basis. Where one of the parties has a question about the interpretation
or application of the City Code, or a compliant about the conduct of another
party, it will approach the executive for guidance or a ruling. Thus, for example,
a bidder might lodge a complaint that the target’s board has failed to provide it
with sufficient disclosure or engaged in impermissible defensive tactics. Where
warranted, the panel will then direct the target board to provide the requisite
information or cease and desist from any action contravening the ‘no frustration’
principle.
Importantly, the City Code expressly contemplates that the executive will
interpret and apply the General Principles and rules on the basis of both their
technical letter and underlying spirit.200 The executive seeks to respond to any
questions or complaints in real time: with most decisions communicated to the
parties by telephone within twenty-four hours.201 While parties are often asked
to provide information, there are no formal rules of evidence and most
interactions with the panel consist of oral communications. Moreover, while the
parties are often represented in these communications, it is typically by their
financial—as opposed to legal—advisers.202 As John Armour and David Skeel
have observed, the panel’s adjudication process is thus “untrammeled by the
procedural and precedential niceties of the courtroom.”203 This procedural
informality, combined with the executive’s expert staff and close involvement
throughout the bid process, enable the U.K. Panel to interpret and apply the City
Code on an expert and dynamic basis in response to the unique facts of each
transaction.204
Residing in the background of this informal adjudication process is the
threat that the U.K. Panel will impose a wide range of sanctions in response to
violations of the City Code. At the more informal end of the enforcement

197.
See City Code, supra note 141, § 4(b), at A9 (explaining that the Code Committee
will then typically undertake a consultation on the expedited rule and subsequently make further
amendments as necessary).
198.
Id. § 5-6.
199.
See Kershaw, supra note 129, at 23.
200.
City Code § 2(b).
201.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1929; see also Emma Armson, Models
for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the UK, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 401, 421 (2005) (discussing
the U.K. procedures).
202.
See Armson, supra note 201, at 421.
203.
Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1729.
204.
Id. at 1745; see also Johnston, supra note 119, at 448.
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spectrum, these sanctions include either a private reprimand or public censure.205
In response to more egregious conduct or repeat offences, the panel can also
issue what is known as a ‘cold shoulder’ statement. The effect of a cold-shoulder
statement is to require any person or firm authorized by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) to cease working with the offending party in connection with
any takeover bid for a specified period of time.206 At the more formal end of the
enforcement spectrum, the panel is empowered to require individuals violating
certain provisions of the City Code to compensate affected shareholders.207 The
panel can also seek a court order to enforce compliance with the City Code208
and report potential misconduct to the FCA.209 Finally, it is a criminal offence
for a person who knew or was reckless to the fact that any bid documentation did
not comply with the City Code and who failed to take reasonable steps to ensure
compliance.210 While there have been relatively few instances in which any of
these sanctions have been imposed—only four cold shoulder statements have
been issued in the panel’s forty-eight-year history—this enforcement regime is
widely viewed as an effective deterrent against violations of the City Code.211
Decisions of the U.K. Panel’s executive are subject to both internal and
external review. Where a party with sufficient interest in the matter wishes to
contest a decision of the executive, this party is entitled to request that the panel’s
Hearings Committee review the matter.212 Any party to a hearing before the
Hearings Committee (or any person denied such a hearing) may then appeal
against the decision to an independent Takeover Panel Board.213 Consistent with
the U.K. Panel’s general approach, hearings before both the Hearings Committee
and Takeover Panel Board are largely informal, typically taking place in person
and in private, and without formal rules of evidence or the involvement of legal
counsel.214 Decisions of the Hearings Committee and Takeover Panel Board are
communicated to the parties in writing as soon as practicable and then usually
published on the panel’s website.215

205.
City Code, supra note 141, § 11(b)(i)-(ii), at A15 (UK).
206.
Id. § 11(b)(v), at A15 (noting that where any authorized person or firm fails to
comply with a “cold-shoulder statement,” they will themselves face sanctions including, in extremis, loss
of authorization).
207.
Id. § 10(c), at A14; see also TAKEOVER PANEL, TAKEOVER PANEL REQUIRES
GUINNESS TO MAKE PAYMENTS TO FORMER DISTILLERS SHAREHOLDERS, 1989/13, at 1 (UK) (requiring
that Guinness pay approximately £85 million in compensation for failing to make a cash alternative
available to shareholders in connection with its bid for Distillers Company).
208.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 955.
209.
City Code, supra note 141, § 11(b)(iv), at A14.
210.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 953.
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See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1784-90; Kershaw, supra note 129, at 2223.
212.
City Code, supra note 141, § 7(a), at A12.
213.
Id. § 8, at A12.
214.
Id. §§ 7, 8, at A12.
215.
Id.
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The decisions of the U.K. Panel are also technically subject to judicial
review. In practice, however, judicial review of the panel’s decisions is relatively
uncommon for two reasons. First, English courts have carefully limited the scope
of any review of the panel’s decisions. The Court of Appeal in ex parte Datafin
determined that the panel must be given “considerable latitude” in the
performance of its functions.216 Consistent with this approach, the court advised
the panel to ignore applications for leave to apply for judicial review in order to
prevent applications from being used as “a mere ploy” in takeover contests.217
Second, the strategy of seeking judicial review is unlikely to pay tactical
dividends in the context of an ongoing takeover bid. As a preliminary matter,
parties will be required to comply with the panel’s decisions while in the process
of seeking judicial review.218 Perhaps more importantly, the Companies Act
2006 provides that contravention of the City Code will not affect the validity or
enforceability of the relevant transactions or give rise to a breach of statutory
duty.219 Reflecting this restrictive approach to the available remedies, courts
have been reluctant to intervene during the course of an active bid.220 As a result,
decisions of the U.K. Panel are typically the final word on the interpretation,
application, and enforcement of the City Code.
In contrast with the U.K. Panel, the Irish Panel has been a statutory body since
its inception. The statutory duties of the Irish Panel are twofold. First, the panel
monitors and supervises takeovers and other relevant transactions221 in order to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Takeover Act and Irish Rules.222
Second, it makes rules in relation to matters within its jurisdiction.223 The
Takeover Act and EU Takeover Directive identify a number of issues that must
be regulated, but the panel has considerable discretion to design and implement
specific rules. For example, the panel is entitled to introduce any rules for the
purpose of “ensuring that takeovers and other relevant transactions comply with
the [General Principles] and the other provisions of this Act.”224 The Irish Panel

216.
Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815, 841
(Eng.). Donaldson MR suggested that the court should grant certiorari and mandamus only where there
had been a breach of natural justice and that in all other cases contemporary decisions of the panel should
take their course and the relationship of the court and panel should be “historic rather than
contemporaneous.” Id.
217.
Id. at 840.
218.
Id. at 840-41.
219.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, §§ 956, 961 (noting that the panel
itself is also exempt from any liability save for acts committed in bad faith or which contravene the United
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act).
220.
See GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 130, at 574-75.
221.
1997 Takeover Panel Act, supra note 156, §§ 5(1)(a), 7(1).
222.
Id.
223.
Id. §§ 5(1)(b), 8.
224.
Id. § 8(1)(b).
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reviews its rules from time to time—often following changes to the City Code—
and generally consults with the public on any proposed changes.225
The functions of the Irish Panel are divided between its board and
permanent executive. The day-to-day work of the Irish Panel is carried out by
the executive. Although, like its U.K. counterpart, the executive bears frontline
responsibility for providing guidance on the interpretation and application of the
Irish Rules, it does not issue rulings.226 The executive is available to respond to
email or telephone enquiries from both the parties to a takeover and the general
public. The executive is also responsible for monitoring dealings in the securities
of relevant companies to ensure compliance with the Irish Rules and General
Principles.
The board is responsible for making formal decisions on the application,
interpretation, and enforcement of the Irish Rules and General Principles. As
with the U.K. Panel, board members are drawn from the financial, business, and
legal communities with each member appointing a director to the board.227 The
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland is responsible for appointing two further
directors who serve as the deputy chairperson and chairperson to the board.228 Once
appointed, all directors carry out their functions independently of their
nominators.229
Parties may apply to the board for a ruling on whether aspects of a
transaction comply with the Irish Rules either as a prophylactic measure or
alleging that another party has breached the rules. The vast majority of
applications are made by the legal or financial advisers to the target or bidder.
These applications often include a request for the panel to give specific directions
to remedy alleged breaches. Save where the panel deems a hearing necessary,
only written representations are accepted. To ensure compliance, the panel may
give a “direction” to any party to do or to refrain from doing anything that the
panel specifies in its direction.230 This may include, for example, a direction to
acquire or dispose of securities, refrain from exercising voting rights attached to
securities, make an offer on specified terms, or disclose any information. Where

225.
It should be noted that § 8(5) of the Takeover Act provides that the approval of the
Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation is needed before changes may be made to the rules relating
to competition legislation and the Substantial Acquisition Rules.
226. But see id. §§ 8(5), 6(2) (noting that it may, however, exercise certain functions
delegated to it by the board).
227.
Id. § 6. (indicating that the members are drawn from the Law Society of Ireland,
the Irish Association of Investment Managers, the Banking and Payments Federation Ireland, the Irish
Stock Exchange, and the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies–Ireland).
228.
See id. § 6(e) (providing that appointment by the members and Governor of alternate
directors ensures that there is a quorum at each meeting, which is important in a small country with a small and
relatively tight-knit business and legal community); see also id. § 6(d) (providing resources where the expertise
available to the panel is considered deficient in the circumstances of any particular takeover). This
provision has been invoked only rarely.
229.
Id. § 6(3) (prohibiting members of the Panel from instructing directors on how to
carry out of their duties under the Act).
230.
Id. § 9(2)(a).
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it has reasonable grounds to believe that there has or will be a contravention of
the Irish Rules or the General Principles, the Irish Panel may initiate an inquiry
into the conduct of any person.231 It may do so on its own initiative, or at the
request of either the Irish Stock Exchange or a party to a transaction. Following
this enquiry, the panel may “advise, admonish or censure” a person in public or
private.232 Notably, however, not every ruling finding a breach results in the
issuance of advice, admonishment, or censure. Additionally, the Irish Panel may
hold a statutory hearing.233 This might be done, for example, where there is
conflicting evidence that needs to be resolved in order to make a ruling. For the
purposes of the hearing, the panel has the same powers, rights, and privileges as
are vested in the High Court in relation to compelling attendance, examination
on oath, and compelling the production of documents.234 At the hearing, the
parties may call witnesses, invite statements from the attendees, and present
arguments. Parties and their advisers are entitled to be present throughout and to
see papers submitted to the panel in connection with the hearing. To date, there
has only been one statutory hearing.235
Notably, despite the statutory nature of Irish merger regulation, “efforts
were made to ensure that this would not give rise to increased litigation,
particularly tactical litigation.”236 Although there is nothing to prevent a party
inviting the Irish Panel to review a ruling or direction, the Takeover Act provides
that the sole method of questioning the validity of a rule, ruling, or direction,
including any derogation or waiver thereof,237 is by means of judicial review.238
The restriction attempts to strike a balance between the protection of
shareholders and ensuring that takeovers are not unnecessarily impeded.239 The
decision of the court is final and leave to appeal will only be granted where the
court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of “exceptional public
importance” and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be
taken.240 In addition, an applicant must seek leave from the court to apply for
judicial review, generally within seven days of the date when the relevant ruling
231.
Id. § 10.
232.
Id. § 10(2)-(3).
233.
Id. § 11.
234.
Id. § 11(4) (indicating that a witness before the panel is also entitled to the same
privileges and immunities as they would before the High Court).
235.
Annual Report 1998, IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL 13, http://irishtakeoverpanel.ie/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/ITP-Annual-Report-1998.pdf [http://perma.cc/3S3V-LV9Q] (describing a
hearing that arose in connection with a complaint that certain directors in a target company had conflicts
of interest in relation to a particular takeover and thus should have been excluded from participating in
the formulation and communication of advice to shareholders, and ruling that the parties were not
conflicted within the meaning of the Irish Rules).
236.
Id. at 8.
237.
1997 Takeover Panel Act § 13(2) (providing that a rule may only be challenged
where the Panel has made a ruling or given a direction based on that particular rule).
238.
Id. § 13.
239.
149 Seanad Deb. (Feb. 6 1997) col. 1692 (Ir.).
240.
1997 Takeover Panel Act, supra note 156, § 13(6). This would not prevent a party
challenging the constitutionality of the law pursuant to Section 13(7).
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or direction is made.241 This strict time limit demonstrates the commitment of
the legislature to the swift settlement of any disputes. It is also consistent with
the recognition by the English Court of Appeal in Datafin of the importance of
speed in the resolution of financial market disputes. Finally, to ensure certainty,
the Takeover Act provides that where transactions have been completed, the
provisions of the Act cannot be used to have them unwound.242 Given these
constraints, it is perhaps not surprising that in its twenty years of operation, the
Irish Panel has only been the subject of a judicial review application on three
occasions.243
D. Obstacles to Shareholder Litigation in the United Kingdom and Ireland
Importantly, the code and panel-based takeover regimes in the United
Kingdom and Ireland have developed against the backdrop of substantive and
procedural rules that dramatically reduce the prospect of shareholder
litigation.244 These rules differ from those in the United States in several
important respects. First, as a substantive matter, the statutory duties of directors
in the United Kingdom and Ireland are explicitly owed to the company itself—
not its shareholders.245 Consistent with this approach, courts tend to treat losses
suffered by both shareholders and the company stemming from the same
underlying facts as reflective losses,246 for which the company—and not
individual shareholders—is entitled to recover.247 While fiduciary and other

241.
Id. § 13(3)(a). Section 13(5) provides that this period may only be extended where
the delay was not caused by the default or neglect of the applicant or any person acting for him and where
an extension would not cause injustice to any other concerned party. Id. § 13(5). Section 13(8) provides
that while an application for leave to apply for judicial review is pending or during the seven-day period
within which such an application may be made, the panel may apply to the court for an order providing
for appropriate interim or interlocutory relief. Id. § 13(8).
242.
Id. § 15. The only circumstances in which a transaction could potentially be
unwound would be where the panel itself applies to the court to annul a transaction that had been carried
out otherwise than in accordance with a ruling or direction, or where a ruling or direction was made on
the basis of false or misleading information provided by a party to the takeover.
243.
In neither of the first two cases did the matter proceed to a hearing. In the third
case, the court reached the stage of making a determination on an application for leave to apply for judicial
review made by Aer Lingus Group (“Aer Lingus”) in respect of a hostile bid by Ryanair Holdings. Aer
Lingus sought to review a decision of the Irish Panel on the duration of a moratorium imposed on Ryanair
under the Irish Rules preventing it from making another offer for Aer Lingus, with Aer Lingus claiming
that the moratorium should have been longer. The High Court refused the leave application on the basis
that Aer Lingus had not established substantial grounds because it had not shown that the interpretation
of the rule by the panel was wrong or even questionable. An order for costs was made by the High Court
in favor of the panel. See Aer Lingus Group PLC v. Irish Takeover Panel [2013] IEHC 428 (Ir.).
244.
For a survey of these procedural rules, see Armour et al., supra note 124, at 26264.
245.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, § 170 (UK); Companies Act 2014,
supra note 181, § 227(1).
246.
See Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC (HL) 1, 51 (UK).
247.
See PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 610-12 (2012).
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duties may also arise at common law,248 courts have historically been extremely
reluctant to extend directors’ duties to individual shareholders.249 As Paul Davies
and Sarah Worthington have observed, special facts and circumstances
warranting such an extension are especially unlikely to arise in the context of
public companies with large and dispersed shareholder bodies.250
Second, shareholders in public companies face significant obstacles in
bringing a derivative action on behalf of a company. The common law rule
articulated in Foss v. Harbottle severely limits the circumstances in which
shareholders in the United Kingdom and Ireland would have standing to bring a
derivative action.251 Perhaps most importantly for the present purposes,
shareholders would be required to establish that a controlling blockholder had
perpetrated a fraud on minority shareholders.252 Understandably, this
requirement is often extremely difficult to satisfy in the case of public
companies. In the United Kingdom, shareholders can also bring a statutory
derivative action.253 However, shareholders seeking to bring a statutory
derivative action must apply to the court for permission.254 In determining
whether to grant permission, the court must take into consideration whether the
applicant is acting in good faith and in accordance with their duty to promote the
success of the company, whether the company has decided not to pursue the
claim, and whether the conduct gives rise to a cause of action that the shareholder
could pursue in their own right.255 The court is also required to refuse permission
where it is satisfied that a person acting in accordance with their duty to promote
the success of the company would not seek to continue the claim, or where the
conduct giving rise to the action has been authorized or ratified by the
corporation.256 As with the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, the U.K. Companies Act
2006 thus erects significant hurdles for shareholders seeking to bring a derivative
action in connection with the conduct of a target board.
Third, as a procedural matter, one of the defining features of the legal
systems in the United Kingdom and Ireland is the relative absence of U.S.-style
class action lawsuits. The closest equivalents in the United Kingdom are what

(UK).

248.

Peskin v. Anderson, [2002] 2 EWCA (Civ.) 326, aff’d, [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 372

249.
See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 247, at 467; THOMAS COURTNEY, THE
LAW OF COMPANIES 744 (2016).
250.
See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 247, at 469.
251.
Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189; 2 Hare 462. For a discussion of the
impact of this case. see DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 247, at 595, and COURTNEY, supra note
249, at 674.
252.
See Birch v. Sullivan [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1247 (Ch.); Crindle Inv. v. Wymes [1998]
4 IR 567, 569 (Ir.).
253.
Companies Act 2006, supra note 152, c. 46, §§ 260-63.
254.
Id. § 261.
255.
Id. § 263(2).
256.
Id. § 263(3).
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are known as group litigation orders257 and in Ireland, representative actions.258
Like U.S. class actions, group litigation orders and representative actions allow
courts to consolidate and manage multiple related claims.259 However, unlike
U.S. class actions, where shareholders will typically be automatically included
in any securities class action unless they opt out, group litigation orders and
representative actions require shareholders to expressly opt into the action.
Plaintiffs in group litigation orders and representative actions are also prevented
from deposing witnesses before trial, thereby depriving them of potentially
valuable investigative opportunities.260 Accordingly, while group litigation
orders and representative actions have recently been used in connection with a
number of high profile cases in the United Kingdom and Ireland,261 these
avenues of redress are unlikely to yield the same benefits for shareholders as
U.S.-style class actions.262
A second potentially significant procedural obstacle to shareholder
litigation in the United Kingdom and Ireland is the “loser pays” principle. This
principle envisions that where a court is required to make an award at trial, the
unsuccessful party will be required to pay the successful party’s costs.263 When
assessed on the standard basis in the United Kingdom,264 these costs include
litigation expenses “reasonably and proportionately incurred” and “reasonable
and proportionate in amount.”265 In Ireland, meanwhile, these costs include all
costs reasonably incurred in the prosecution of a claim or the defense of the

257.
UK R. CIV. P. 19.11.
258.
Representative actions allow a party to sue on behalf of specified persons who
have authorized the application and who have the “same interest” in the claim. See Order 15, Rule 9 of
the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986; see also Niall Collins et al., Class/Collective Actions in Ireland,
PRAC. L. GLOBAL GUIDE (2016), http://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-618-0420 [http://perma.cc
/PL4R-MWTL] for a fuller discussion on this point. Any settlement of a representative action is binding
on all the authorizing parties. Notably, these actions cannot be used for tort claims and remedies are
limited to injunctive and declaratory relief.
259.
UK R. CIV. P.19.10 (stipulating that these claims must “give rise to common or
related issues of fact or law”).
260.
See Kurt Hunciker & Jake Nachmani, The State of International Shareholder
Litigation: Comparing Outlooks in the US and UK, ADVOCATE 3 (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.blbglaw.com
/news/publications/data/00179/_res/id=File1/Adv_Fall2014_Hunciker_Nachmani.pdf [http://perma.cc
/Z52D-F4H6]
261.
See Guidance: Group Litigation Orders, H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNAL SERVS. (Aug. 7,
2015), http://www.gov.uk/guidance/group-litigation-orders [http://perma.cc/C8PQ-NCF8] (providing a
list and brief summary of all outstanding group litigation orders granted in the United Kingdom to date;
in total, ninety-five group litigation orders have been granted since 2000).
262.
See Hunciker & Nachmani, supra note 260, at 4-5.
263.
See U.K. R. CIV. P. 44.2; SUPERIOR COURTS RULES COMM., IRISH RULES OF THE
SUPERIOR COURTS (1986), r. 1(3).
264.
U.K. R. CIV. P. 44.3 (noting that costs can also be assessed on an “indemnity” basis
where the costs were “unreasonably incurred” or “unreasonable in amount”).
265.
Id.
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proceedings.266 Courts in both the United Kingdom and Ireland retain the
discretion to deviate from the loser pays principle on a case-by-case basis.267
Finally, both the United Kingdom and Ireland impose relatively tight
restrictions on the use of contingency fee arrangements. In the United Kingdom,
so-called “conditional fee agreements” are permitted subject to a cap on any
success fee equal to 100% of legal costs.268 Any success fee is payable by the
client in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Barristers and solicitors in
the United Kingdom can also use so-called “damage-based agreements,”
entitling them to a proportion of any sums recovered in successful litigation. Like
contingent fee agreements, however, these damaged-based agreements are
subject to a cap: typically 50% of the recovered sum in commercial cases.269 In
Ireland, meanwhile, contingency fee arrangements are unenforceable.270
Collectively, these rules make it relatively difficult for shareholders in the
United Kingdom and Ireland to use litigation as a means of compelling
disclosure or constraining conflicts of interest in the context of public takeovers.
The fact that directors’ duties are owed directly to the corporation, along with
the jurisprudential and statutory safeguards around derivative actions by
shareholders, serve to limit the scope of actionable claims. Compounding
matters, the practice of forcing the loser to pay increases the costs of litigation,
deterring shareholders from commencing actionable claims—especially where
the legal costs are likely to be high in relation to the expected damage awards.271
The absence of U.S.-style class actions further increases the upfront costs of
litigation for both shareholders and their legal counsel, while restrictions on
contingency fees dilute the incentives of entrepreneurial counsel who might
otherwise be willing to assume the risk of initiating group litigation.272 Viewed
from this perspective, the broader legal environment in the United Kingdom and
Ireland thus serves as something of a complement to the prevailing mode of
merger regulation, deterring nuisance litigation and entrenching the U.K. and
Irish Panels as the principal adjudicators of shareholder rights in connection with
public takeover bids.
266.
The Taxing Master of the High Court is an independent officer of the Court who
provides an independent and impartial process of assessment of legal costs, seeking to achieve a balance
between the costs involved and the services rendered.
267.
UK R. CIV. P. 44.2 (noting that in exercising this discretion, courts in the United
Kingdom are required to take into consideration the conduct of the parties, whether the unsuccessful party
has been successful in any aspect of the case, and any admissible settlement offers).
268.
The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013, SI 2013/689, § 3.
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The Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013, SI No. 609, § 4(3).
270.
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(Amendment)
Act
1994
(Act
No.
68/1994)
(Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1994/act/27/section/68/enacted/en/html
[http://perma.cc/5DGLDHZE]; BAR OF IR., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE BAR OF IRELAND § 12(e) (2014).
271.
See Michael R. Baye et al., Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An
Auction-Theoretic Approach, 115 ECON. J. 583 (2005); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation
and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1995);
Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 345-48 (1990).
272.
Armour et al., supra note 119, at 262-264.
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III.Assessing the Efficiency of Alternative Modes of Regulation
The previous Part outlined two distinctive models for regulating mergers:
the U.S. system of regulation by litigation and the Anglo-Irish regulatory system
of detailed codes written, interpreted, and enforced by expert panels. This part
compares the relative efficiency of the two approaches. After reviewing the
economic literature on regulation versus litigation and applying it to the specific
context of merger regulation, this part articulates an alternative to the current
U.S. approach that draws both on the theoretical literature and the Anglo-Irish
example.
A. The Costs and Benefits of the Current U.S. Model
Much of the prior work comparing the relative costs and benefits of
regulation versus litigation focuses on a single aspect of the comparison—for
example, (regulatory) rules versus (judicial) standards, or ex ante (regulation)
versus ex post (litigation) scrutiny.273 Yet there are at least two accounts—one
by Richard Posner, the other by Steven Shavell—that offer a more
comprehensive framework for assessing the efficiency of regulation versus
litigation.274 Each of these accounts frames the comparison as a tradeoff between
four key factors. Posner emphasizes: (1) the use of rules versus standards; (2)
whether these rules or standards are designed to act as ex ante prophylactics
versus ex post deterrents; (3) whether they are designed and implemented by
experts versus generalists; and (4) whether the enforcement process is public
versus private. Shavell, meanwhile, emphasizes: (1) any special knowledge that
private parties or regulators possess in relation to the relevant risks; (2) the
capacity of private parties to pay for any harm stemming from the materialization
of these risks; (3) the likelihood that the materialization of these risks would
result in a lawsuit; and (4) administrative costs. Many of the factors identified by
Posner and Shavell are closely related, if not overlapping.
The first two factors in Posner’s framework—ex ante versus ex post and
rules versus standards—typically come together as a single package.
Paradigmatic regulatory decision making proceeds ex ante and according to a
body of rules, while litigation proceeds on the basis of ex post adjudication
according to a set of broad standards. For example, when fire inspectors enter a

273.
See, e.g., Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the Choice
Between Ex-Post Liability and Ex-Ante Regulation, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 29, 35 (2004) (explaining
the cost and benefits of ex ante versus ex post scrutiny); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact,
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2007) (explaining the costs and benefits of ex ante versus ex post systems).
274.
Compare Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts):
An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND
LAW 11, 13 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011), with Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUDS. 357, 357 (1984). Shavell is more specifically focused on the efficiency of
regulatory rules versus liability in tort. However, this question largely overlaps with the question of
regulation versus efficiency.
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building, they conduct their inspection according to a codified set of procedures
prior to the start of any fire. When a warehouse burns down due to a neighbor’s
alleged negligence, the judge decides the case after the fact according to a general
standard of care. The tradeoff between these two modes of regulation hinges on
the level of technical specificity involved in deciding each case. Ex ante analysis
is largely categorical, grouping problems according to type and excluding details
not previously specified in the rules.275 In Posner’s words, the use of ex ante rules
thus “buys precision at the cost of excluding case-specific information that the
promulgators of the regulation either did not anticipate or excluded in order to
keep the regulation simple.”276 Ex post litigation, on the other hand, takes these
case-specific details into account—thereby increasing accuracy, but often at the
cost of considerable time and administrative expense. However, Posner
emphasizes that litigation may also economize on administrative costs by
intervening on a sporadic rather than a constant basis—with costs incurred only
when claims are actually brought.277
Posner’s analysis on these first two points largely overlaps with Shavell’s
consideration of the likelihood that a lawsuit will be brought and the associated
administrative costs. In addition to litigation costs being incurred only when
claims are actually filed, Shavell also emphasizes that litigation may distribute
costs more efficiently by concentrating costs on those parties most likely to cause
harm. In Shavell’s view, this stands in contrast with administrative regulation,
which typically spreads these costs across a class of actors that may or may not
engage in harmful conduct.278 Furthermore, with regard to the likelihood that a
suit will be brought, Shavell emphasizes that regulation may be especially
appropriate in those situations where injured parties might fail to bring suit,
thereby leaving the harmful conduct unregulated. Posner captures the same
concern in his consideration of the public nature of regulation versus the private
nature of litigation: because litigation is privately financed, important claims
may not be advanced.279
The current U.S. system of regulation by litigation does not measure up
well against these first two factors. The fact that litigation is brought in virtually
every transaction belies the notion of administrative savings from sporadic legal
interventions. The near certainty of litigation also suggests that costs are not
concentrated on those most likely to have caused harm. Imposing costs on all
transacting parties functions as an indiscriminate levy rather than a targeted

275.
However, as we explain, this issue can be addressed by establishing processes that
facilitate the refinement of existing rules, along with the adoption of new rules, in response to
developments in the real world.
276.
See Posner, supra note 274, at 14.
277.
Id. at 15 (explaining that ex post regulation “economizes on administrative
expense because intervention is sporadic, and utilizes both case-specific information . . . and adversary
procedure, which may increase accuracy”).
278.
See Shavell, supra note 274, at 373.
279.
See Posner, supra note 274, at 26.
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sanction aimed at deterring harmful conduct. The settlement aspect of merger
litigation, however, might suggest more of a hybrid system. Judicial review of
merger activity typically occurs at a settlement hearing prior to the close of the
transaction. At the same time, the non-adversarial nature of settlement hearings
suggests that the benefit of extracting case-specific information via litigation is
also absent.280 Judges must either accept the settlement that the parties put
forward or scrutinize the settlement without the benefit of either adversarial
briefing or the kind of detailed code or rulebook that a similarly situated regulator
might possess.
In Delaware, at least, the accretion of precedent in this context has enabled
judges to formulate a kind of rubric for disclosure settlements. For example,
disclosures must be plainly material,281 which typically involves a previously
undisclosed conflict of interest282 or a withheld piece of financial information
that would change how the company is valued.283 However, it should not be
taken for granted that other courts will benefit from either the accumulation of
precedent or the judicial expertise necessary to work through what is, in effect,
a kind of regulatory analysis. And at least so far, Delaware has been unable to
ensure jurisdiction over all merger litigation, even for Delaware incorporated
companies. Furthermore, the “plainly material” standard remains a standard,
susceptible to varying interpretations by different judges and courts.284 The lack
of a clear ex ante rulebook thus increases transactional uncertainty, thereby
imposing costs on transacting parties.
The current hybrid, in other words, may be the worst of both worlds. It has
the high costs of litigation—applied indiscriminately and in every case—with
the general lack of precision associated with regulatory systems. Worse, the
judicial application of standards rather than regulatory rules leads to
unpredictability and makes compliance difficult to achieve without frequent
resort to litigation.285 Finally, because bringing a claim in this context is not the
same as pursuing truly adversarial litigation, conduct resulting in substantial
harm may not be seriously scrutinized.286 All of this suggests that it may be worth
considering an alternative approach to merger regulation in the United States.287
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Another parallel between Posner’s and Shavell’s frameworks is the
relevance of experts and expertise. According to Posner, expert administrative
bodies are better at accumulating a body of specialized knowledge. Because they
are unbound by precedent, these administrative bodies are also able to adopt
more responsive and flexible approaches to changing real world problems.
However, a downside to highly flexible administrative regulation, described in
greater detail below, is the possibility of regulatory capture.288 Courts of general
jurisdiction, in contrast, are thought to be largely immune from interest-group
pressure, but may also be less flexible due to the lack of specialized knowledge,
limited investigatory resources, and “cumbersome and to a degree antiquated
procedures.”289 Like Posner, Shavell emphasizes special knowledge but focuses,
in the first instance, on the parties themselves rather than the ultimate decisionmaker. According to Shavell, where the parties possess special knowledge
relevant to the underlying risk, liability rules may be superior insofar as they
allow the parties to strike an informed bargain around that risk.290 If, on the other
hand, knowledge about the underlying risk is generalizable, then an
administrative body could attain sufficient expertise to regulate the risk without
excessive risk of error.291
In the context of merger transactions, shareholders are generally concerned
about two things. First, they must be provided with adequate information to make
an informed decision on the merits of the proposed transaction. Second, they are
likely to be concerned about the prospect of a management conflict that has the
effect of suppressing the value of the company at sale. The first concern is
eminently generalizable. Indeed, it has largely been generalized in Delaware
precedents relating to the value of individual disclosures in connection with
merger litigation. Hence, there is no barrier to the distillation of these types of
information into a set of rules and principles on merger disclosure, rules which
have largely been written not only by the U.K. and Irish Panels, but also in large
part by the SEC.292
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Id. at 359 (“[I]f the information possessed by a regulator is superior to private
parties and the courts . . . the use of direct regulation would be more attractive than liability.”).
292.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (describing how in
the United States the federal securities laws authorize the SEC to promulgate rules relating to disclosures
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rules to Delaware disclosure cases).

45

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 35, 2018

Managerial conflict of interest, however, presents a distinct rule-making
challenge. Although the type of problem—the existence of a conflict of
interest—may be readily generalizable, these conflicts can arise in a wide range
of circumstances and in myriad forms. The determination of whether the problem
is present in any given case thus necessarily demands the kind of a fact-intensive
ex post investigation to which common law courts are well suited. Accordingly,
common law courts may retain a comparative advantage over regulatory systems
in policing conflicts of interest. We do not want to overstate this advantage,
however, as both the U.K. and Irish Panels retain ex post investigative powers
over breaches of both the General Principles as well as detailed rules, thus at
least partially offsetting the advantages of ex post litigation in this regard.
Finally, both Posner and Shavell consider the capacity of private parties to
pay for any harm stemming from the materialization of the relevant risks. Their
principal insight is that, if the potential liability exceeds the defendant’s ability
to pay, then liability rules will not create sufficient incentives to meet the desired
standard of care.293 Regulation would therefore be preferable in this situation.294
Of all the factors considered by Shavell and Posner, this is the most difficult one
to apply in the context of merger activity. Merger transactions do not map neatly
onto the standard tort paradigm in which the prospect of damages leads parties
to take care. In the merger context, the greatest threat to the transacting parties is
the possibility of an injunction and the resulting collapse of the proposed
transaction. While there is also the risk of liability for fraud or conflict of interest
on the part of individual officers or directors, these are secondary considerations
at best.295 When injunctive relief is the real risk, ability to pay is not relevant.
On balance, then, application of these factors suggests that regulation by
litigation is not a particularly efficient mode of merger regulation. However, it is
also clear that the present system of merger regulation—at least in Delaware—
is a hybrid system, with some attributes typical of regulation and others typical
of litigation. Hybrid systems, of course, are highly likely to emerge in the real
world. And both Posner and Shavell suggest that hybrid systems may often be
preferable. Posner emphasizes regulation and litigation as complements rather
than substitutes.296 Shavell likewise suggests that a “complete solution to the
problem of the control of risk should involve the joint use of liability and

293.
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See Posner, supra note 274, at 23 (using antitrust as an example to emphasize that
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Justice Department or FTC merger guidelines; and judges review the rulings of administrative agencies
for compliance with statutes and with principles of fair procedure”).
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regulation, with the balance between them reflecting the importance of the
determinants.”297 We sketch one possible hybrid approach in the next section.
B. Towards an Administrative Alternative for U.S. Merger Regulation
In this Section, we propose a regulatory alternative to the current litigationcentric model of U.S. merger regulation. This alternative draws on both the
theoretical considerations canvassed above and, importantly, the Anglo-Irish
example. Our alternative is a hybrid. We propose an ex ante regulatory panel to
guarantee a basic level of disclosure and procedural fairness in merger
transactions. Panel approval, however, would not foreclose the right of
shareholders to bring suit ex post in connection with serious harms. To control
the threat of nuisance claims in this context, we recommend the adoption of
procedural rules to ensure that cases are only pursued when there is evidence of
substantial wrongdoing, rather than minor deficiencies in corporate disclosure.
It is important to emphasize that we are sketching out a procedural model
for merger regulation without regard to the underlying substance of the law. The
underlying substance of takeover law could, for example, permit takeover
defenses (as in the United States) or prohibit them (as in the United Kingdom
and Ireland). Our model remains agnostic on this and other substantive choices,
such as whether to prescribe a strict schedule for responding to takeover bids (as
in the United Kingdom and Ireland) or to leave the matter to the discretion of the
target board (as in the United States). Here we are focused purely on the
procedural mode of merger regulation.
Finally, although we think our alternative offers significant advantages over
the current system of regulation by litigation, ours is but one way of conceiving
a regulatory alternative. Many more could be imagined. Any U.S. state could
adopt a regulatory approach as part of its state corporate law. Alternatively, the
regulatory model could be made a part of federal securities regulation. While the
discussion that follows assumes a model adopted under state corporate law, it
would also apply (with minor modifications) to the federal context.
1. The Administrative Panel
Following the Anglo-Irish example, the frontline work in our regulatory
model would be performed by an administrative panel reviewing each merger
transaction. Like the U.K. and Irish models, the panel would be staffed by
experts—perhaps including prominent M&A practitioners, current or former
members of the judiciary, representatives from institutional investors,
investment bankers, accountants, and academic lawyers and economists. The
panel would write, interpret, and enforce rules and principles to govern the
merger process, including conflicts of interest and the timing and content of
297.
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required disclosures. Parties to the transaction would also be able to approach
the panel with questions and concerns. Like the U.K. and Irish panels, the panel
would aim to provide real-time answers to questions and to review and respond
to submissions as quickly as possible. Importantly, our panel would be
responsible for conducting a general review of preliminary proxy statements for
the adequacy of disclosures. The completion of an initial review, however, would
not bar the panel from revisiting disclosure issues in the event of a complaint or
the subsequent revelation of new information. The panel would also be
empowered to investigate potential conflicts of interest with the goal not of
improving the economics of the transaction but of ensuring full disclosure.
Structured in this way, our administrative approach to merger regulation
would provide several advantages. The first set of advantages stems from the
scrutiny of transactions by expert panels. Although most deals currently attract
litigation, it is far from clear that those claims subject transactions to serious
oversight.298 In contrast, the panel approach would ensure that every transaction
is reviewed by experts with specialized knowledge in the field. Every deal would
receive a threshold level of ex ante scrutiny, enabling the panel to implement
corrective disclosure where necessary prior to the shareholder vote. The threat
that the panel would require parties to make corrective disclosures—and the
potential impact this would have on shareholders’ view of the reputations of the
parties, the credibility of these disclosures and, ultimately, the outcome of the
transaction—would incentivize parties to disclose all potentially material
information as quickly as possible.
Second, the panel’s review would proceed according to a clear set of rules
regarding what specific information—such as financial valuations—must be
disclosed in particular types of transactions, and which potential issues—such as
conflicts—may require more detailed discussion. Clear ex ante rules enhance
certainty, and improve the ability of transaction planners to structure and quickly
close deals. These rules could include “disclose or explain” obligations,
requiring transacting parties to reveal information to the panel that they would,
perhaps for competitive reasons, withhold from the proxy statement.299
Moreover, the body of rules would make the panel’s analysis more predictable
to transaction planners, leading them to incorporate the information into their
disclosures and thereby obviating the need for extensive regulatory involvement
in many cases. At the same time, while operating on the basis of a clearly
articulated body of rules, our panel, like the U.K. and Irish Panels, would be
empowered to enforce General Principles and, like the U.K. Panel, seek

298.
See supra Part I.
299.
For an analysis of the effectiveness of “comply and explain” approaches generally,
see Sridhar Arcot et al., Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?,
30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 201 (2010); Luca Enriques & Paulo Volpin, Corporate Governance
Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117, 130 (2007); and Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li,
“Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 486, 486 (2015).
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compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law. This would allow the
panel’s interpretations to take new developments and idiosyncrasies of
individual cases into account.300
Third, in contrast to the reactive nature of common law rulemaking,301
which relies heavily on the incentives of the parties to unearth and litigate
issues,302 our panel system—like its U.K. and Irish models—would continuously
monitor market developments and proactively evaluate whether developments
warrant refinement to the underlying code and rules.303 Any such changes could
be implemented quickly. In addition, our proactive regulatory approach would
curb the strategic incentive of defendants to withhold information from their
preliminary proxy statements in order to set up a disclosure settlement later.304
These practices degrade the quality of corporate disclosures if the deal is never
challenged or, more likely, if plaintiffs’ counsel does not seek disclosure of the
particular information withheld. Under our approach, there would be no
incentive to withhold information and every incentive to disclose all material
information immediately in order to guarantee a quick regulatory review and
avoid any reputational damage from being compelled by the panel to make
additional disclosures.
A fourth advantage of the panel system is speed. While Delaware courts
are doubtlessly some of the fastest in the world, most cases still take several
weeks from filing to completion—and in some cases significantly longer. Parties
to a transaction in the United Kingdom or Ireland, meanwhile, need only
telephone the executive for immediate guidance. Similarly, a ruling may be
obtained from the executive in the United Kingdom or the panel in Ireland in a
matter of days or less.
Fifth, in terms of administrative costs, we expect that our approach will be
less costly overall than the present system that allows attorneys on both sides to
seek rents in every transaction. The regulatory approach would move from
litigation in virtually every deal to, we expect, ligation in very few deals.305 The
300.
City Code, supra note 141, Intro. § 2(b), at A2 (explaining that in the United
Kingdom, the executive is expressly empowered to apply the City Code on the basis of its underlying
spirit); 1997 Takeover Panel Act, supra note 156, General Principles (noting that the panel still has a
considerable degree of latitude despite the statutory nature of the Irish rules).
301.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124, at 1730 (noting that rulemaking within
common law systems involves an incremental and largely uncoordinated process of articulating, refining,
and distinguishing precedents).
302.
See supra Section IV.B; see also Paul Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency:
Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 19 (2005); Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency
in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. L. REV. 1551 (2003).
303.
The two panels are thus designed to proactively intervene to ensure that the rules
evolve to reflect changes in the takeover process. As one court has put it, the panel “acts as a sort of fire
brigade to extinguish quickly the flames of unacceptable and unfair practice.” Regina v. Panel on
Takeovers & Mergers, Ex parte Guinness Plc (1988) 4 BCC 325, 338 (UK).
304.
See supra Section IV.B.
305.
Insofar as our model moves the United States towards the Anglo-Irish system, it
may be useful to compare the litigation rates of the United States and the United Kingdom in mergers and
acquisitions transactions.

49

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 35, 2018

operations of the panel would not be free, of course, but there is reason to believe
that companies would pay far less for panel review than they currently pay in
attorneys’ fees to litigate and settle merger claims. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the operations of the U.K. Panel are funded by way of small “document
charges” levied in connection with formal offers exceeding £1 million, fees on
block transactions in shares listed on the London Stock Exchange, sales of the
City Code, and other minor charges.306 These charges are likely a small fraction
of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, defense attorneys’ fees, and court costs in the U.S.
system. In the United Kingdom, for example, a transaction worth £1 billion
would cost £175,000 ($215,000) in document charges. The Irish Panel,
meanwhile, charges a fee of €62,500 ($66,520) on all offers over €125 million,
with a reduced fee for lower value offers but an additional charge where the
bidder is not a relevant company. In the United States, by contrast, plaintiffs’
attorney’s fees alone typically run over $400,000 in disclosure settlements.307
Defense attorneys’ fees are undisclosed but are likely similarly high (or
higher).308 A straightforward comparison of administrative expenses thus plainly
favors the Anglo-Irish system.
The more significant cost associated with administrative regulation may be
the upfront costs of drafting a set of rules and procedures for merger review.
However, a clear rubric of principles already exists under Delaware law,309 SEC
rules,310 the Takeovers Directive, and in the rules and principles of takeover
panels around the world.311 While this drafting exercise would not be costless,
states would be starting from a relatively clear set of blueprints reflecting tried
and tested provisions.
The other potential cost of administrative regulation is the risk of regulatory
capture.312 Moving from judicial regulation to a form of administrative

306.
See City Code, supra note 141, at A17 (UK); Annual Statement, TAKEOVER PANEL
(2016), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/reports [http://perma.cc/WN95-HLN5].
307.
See Cain & Solomon, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting median plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees of $410,000 for disclosure settlements in 2015).
308.
Corporations typically retain transaction advisors and, when claims are filed,
separate litigation counsel, who charge a separate (substantial) fee. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 99,
at 1081 n.122 (reporting that the defense side cost to brief and argue a preliminary injunction motion could
run to $1.5 million).
309.
See, e.g., Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., 11 A.3d 1175,
1179 (Del. Ch. 2010).
310.
See supra text accompanying note 292. Although a comparison of the substance
of the SEC rules with the City Code or the Irish Rules is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be
noted that the two systems are not incompatible. In practice, any conflicts may be resolved by the panels
exercising their broad regulatory discretion to waive or derogate from a rule once there is compliance with
the General Principles.
311.
These would include, for example, the City Code, the Irish Rules, the Singapore
Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, and the Corporations Act of 2001.
312.
Regulatory capture occurs when a special interest persuades a regulator to deviate
from the public interest in order to delivery private benefits to the interest group, as for example when a
regulated industry persuades a government regulator to erect barriers to entry. See, e.g., George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
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regulation would seem to increase the risk of capture.313 In the context of merger
regulation, the standard source of this critique is management.314 The fear would
thus be that a regulatory panel might be more subject to capture from managerial
interests than a judicial decision-maker. In response to this critique, we would
point out first that our proposed code and panel-based system is neutral with
regard to the substance of corporate law—neutral, that is, with regard to the
appropriate balance between managerial versus shareholder interests. It is a
recommendation only with regard to process or form. Thus, insofar as a state
adopted our model of merger regulation but imposed a rule structure that
excessively favored management interests, we would expect the standard
mechanism—competition in the market for corporate law and investors’ interest
in efficient corporate governance rules—to correct any imbalance in due
course.315 Moreover, the standard focus on the special interests of management
fails to account for the role of another interest group—the bar—on the
development of corporate law.316 As described in further detail below, the current
shape of Delaware corporate law generally, and takeover jurisprudence in
particular, largely reflects the interest of the corporate bar.317 Thus, insofar as
our model moves regulatory authority away from courtrooms and lawyers, it
should reduce rather than increase this kind of capture. Further, the risk of
capture could be further contained by carefully choosing the interests represented
on the panel board.318
2. Procedural Reforms to Prevent Nuisance Suits
Because regulatory review does not replicate true adversarial litigation, we
do not recommend that the panel review fully replace ex post litigation. While
the panel can adequately address disclosure issues, including the disclosure of
information suggesting possible conflicts of interest, it may be unable to uncover
or provide relief for extensive harm to shareholders from conflicted or otherwise
unfaithful managers. As a result, shareholder litigation remains an important
outside option, even in a code and panel-based takeover regime.

313.
See Posner, supra note 274.
314.
See, e.g., Cary, supra note 28 (claiming that Delaware law caters to management
interests over the interests of shareholders and the public).
315.
See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATION LAW 144 (1993) (describing the impact of charter competition on the structure of the rules
governing the market for corporate control in the United States).
316.
See Macey & Miller, supra note 77, at 46.
317.
See infra Part IV.
318.
The risk of regulatory capture is mitigated in Ireland and the United Kingdom by
ensuring that the members of the U.K. and Irish Panels representing interest groups, once appointed, are
completely independent. Should a conflict of interest arise with any particular member in a specific
transaction, the member in question steps aside. See City Code, supra note 141, § 4 App. 9.5; Irish Rules,
supra note 160, tbl.10.

51

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 35, 2018

However, given the demonstrated tendency of merger claims to devolve
into nuisance litigation, we would build in a set of procedural protections—again
mimicking the Anglo-Irish system—to prevent lawyers and litigants from
imposing these costs on shareholders, corporations, and the corporate law. In
particular, we would recommend a set of procedural rules implementing a
modified fee shifting rule or, at a minimum, a provision barring corporations
from paying plaintiffs’ side fees. Fee shifting remains highly controversial in the
United States, in large part because the system relies upon private litigation to
right what are effectively public wrongs.319 The statutory invalidation of fee
shifting in Delaware, however, may say more about the political economy of
Delaware corporate law than it does about the desirability of fee shifting per
se.320 Fee shifting, along with the absence of U.S.-style class action lawsuits,
works well to control the extent of shareholder litigation in Ireland and the
United Kingdom. Crucially, however, the takeover regimes in these jurisdictions
provide an effective substitute to litigation as a mechanism for the basic
protection of shareholder rights.321 The panel in our model would play a
fundamentally similar role. The backstop protection offered by the panel means
it would no longer be necessary to rely on shareholder litigation as the sole means
of protecting shareholder rights.
If the abolition of the shareholder class action or the imposition of fee
shifting rules appear too extreme, a similar result might be attained by adopting
a basic No Pay provision that would preclude the corporation from paying
attorneys’ fees and costs for specified outcomes in representative litigation.
Corporations customarily pay such fees and costs in connection with shareholder
class actions on the basis of the “corporate benefit” doctrine, a corollary to the
“common fund” doctrine in equity.322 The near certainty of a fee award under
the corporate benefit doctrine has played a large part in fueling the explosive
growth of merger litigation.323 The obvious corrective, therefore, is a corporate
law with the opposite default rule.324
Nothing prevents a state from adopting a statute to preclude the corporation
from paying plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in connection with shareholder litigation
unless the litigation recovered meaningful relief for shareholders, such as

319.
See Choi, supra note 81.
320.
See infra Section IV.A.
321.
See supra Section II.C.
322.
See Griffith, supra note 3, at 38-40 (noting that the common fund doctrine entitles
plaintiffs’ counsel to be paid from funds recovered in representative litigation); id at 3 (explaining that the
corporate benefit doctrine extended the logic of the common fund doctrine to the derivative suit context,
and that when a derivative suit results in non-monetary relief, the common benefit doctrine allows
plaintiffs’ counsel to be paid by the corporation, the recipient of the benefit and the party on whose behalf
the lawyer was technically working); id. at 2 (noting that a further expansion of the doctrine led courts to
apply the corporate benefit rationale to non-pecuniary relief in class actions as well as derivative suits).
323.
Id.
324.
See Griffith, supra note 100, at 16.
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monetary recovery or, perhaps, monetary recovery of a specified amount.325
Unlike fee shifting provisions, No Pay provisions do not seek to punish
plaintiffs’ lawyers. They simply refuse to pay for failure and force the
shareholders to bear their own fees and costs. The likely effect of such a rule
would be to cause entrepreneurial lawyers to abandon all but the most profitable
claims—that is, those claims most likely to return a monetary award to
shareholders at least equal to the statutory threshold amount. In a system where
litigation is the only means of acquitting shareholder rights, such a rule may raise
concerns. However, in a system such as the one we propose, where low-value
and non-pecuniary shareholder rights are protected by means of an
administrative panel, it is less of a risk to limit litigation to high value claims.326
Under our model, shareholder litigation would be reserved only for fraud
or similarly grievous wrongs, precisely those claims that entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ lawyers—that is, those who are not members of the “disclosure
settlement bar”327—are willing and able to finance. Without expressly limiting
litigation rights, the additional regulation will merely add a layer of additional
cost to what is already widely acknowledged as a crisis in shareholder litigation.
At the same time, administrative regulation should not be viewed simply as a
substitute for shareholder litigation. It is a complement.328 The goal here is to
strike a balance that preserves litigation rights only for those claims that are
worth preserving. In our view, this is best accomplished with a No Pay provision
keyed to a common fund at a specified threshold value.
IV.

Convergence Versus Persistence

Our account of the different modes of regulation employed in the American
and the Anglo-Irish systems explained the evolution of those differences as a
function of the divergent institutional interests and structural constraints
operating within these systems.329 After the takeover wave of the 1950s and
1960s, the influence of institutional shareholders and tradition of self-regulation
pushed the United Kingdom to develop a system of administrative panels for
takeover regulation. The United States, meanwhile, after ceding market
regulation to the federal government in the 1930s, responded through

325.
The common benefit doctrine is a common law default rule which can be altered
by statute. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 180 (2016) (noting that there is no longer a presumption against statutory
derogation of common law and that statutes can override common law principles); see also A.W. Fin.
Servs., S.A. v. Empire Res., Inc., 981 A.2d 1114, 1123 (Del. 2009) (acknowledging several ways in which
statutory enactments can supplant the common law).
326.
Additionally, we would advise states to adopt such statutes as default rather than
mandatory provisions, allowing corporations to opt out through the corporate charter. However, we expect
that this opt-out right would be rarely, if ever, invoked.
327.
See Friedlander, supra note 3, at 909.
328.
See Posner, supra note 274.
329.
See supra Parts I & II.
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amendments to the securities laws and the development of corporate law
jurisprudence.330 While this story may account for the emergence of different
regulatory regimes, it does not account for their remarkable persistence. Path
dependency weakens as an explanatory theory when the underlying institutional
structures change.
In the intervening half-century, institutional investors have risen to
prominence in the U.S. market to a point where they now hold the vast majority
of the shares of the thousand or so largest companies.331 Barriers to
communication between institutional investors have also largely disappeared,
and institutions now coordinate through organizations such as the Council on
Institutional Investors (CII) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).332
Moreover, institutional investors and activists alike have shown a willingness to
coalesce around corporate governance reforms, such as the dismantling of
staggered boards and greater representation of independent directors on
boards.333 In light of the disappearance of these structural distinctions and the
emergence of the crisis in merger litigation, why has the U.S. model not moved
closer to the Anglo-Irish model? Alternatively, given the proliferation of crossborder mergers and acquisitions, global capital markets, and the spread of U.S.style litigation, why has the Anglo-Irish system not moved closer to the U.S.
system of regulation by litigation? Why, in other words, have the modes of
regulation remained dissimilar in an era of convergence and globalization?
In this part, we consider the failure of convergence. We lay the blame not
with any defect in the market for corporate charters but rather in the relative
strength of different interest groups. The first section evaluates the strength of
the interstate market for corporate charters in the United States. The second
section considers the interests of the different interest groups that empower—
and are empowered by—the alternative modes of regulation, focusing on the
pivotal role of the corporate bar within the U.S. system. The third and final
section briefly considers the ways in which the Anglo-Irish model may be
moving closer to the litigation-centric U.S. model and asks whether further
convergence in this direction is likely.

330.
In turn, the institutional interests represented in the self-regulatory model, on the
one hand, and the litigation model, on the other, may explain the differing substance of takeover
regulation. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 124.
331.
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (“[T]he
Berle-Means premise of dispersed share ownership is now wrong. In 2011, for example, institutional
investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.”).
332.
See generally COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., http://www.cii.org/
[http://perma.cc/KD2R-S9LY]; INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., http://www.issgovernance.com/
[http://perma.cc/MH9M-PGLU].
333.
See Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 149, 151 (2008).
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A. Barriers to Competition in the Market for Corporate Charters
The institutional context for corporate law change in the United States has
been the interstate market for corporate charters and the threat of SEC preemption of state corporate lawmaking. Any state that wanted to adopt a
regulatory structure similar to the one we articulated above could do so, as could
the federal government by amendment to the securities laws. Moreover, if the
structure promises the efficiencies we have claimed, the market for corporate
charters would seem to give states a strong incentive to adopt a regulatory model
similar to the one we have articulated in order to raise revenue by “selling” more
corporate charters. The fact that no state has done so may belie the efficiencies
that we have claimed. Or it may point to defects in the U.S. market for corporate
charters.
Some have doubted the dynamism of competition in the market for
corporate charters, observing that few states behave as if they are seeking to win
business from Delaware.334 Nevertheless, states do clearly react to retain
corporations chartered in their state by adapting their corporate law in response
to changes in other states.335 Moreover, the idea that states neither compete to
attract corporate charters, nor have anything to gain from doing so, is
contradicted by the example of Nevada. Nevada actively and successfully
competes with Delaware for corporate charters.336 Because Nevada competes by
providing broad exculpation for managers—for everything short of outright
fraud337—it is cited as an example of the “race to the bottom.”338 Others dispute
this characterization, arguing that Nevada law allows firms to save on the
monitoring and litigation costs imposed by Delaware,339 savings which may be
of special appeal to smaller firms that are less able to absorb such costs.340

334.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 679 (2002).
335.
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 237 (2006).
336.
When Nevada flipped the default provision in its corporate law statute, changing
exculpation from an opt-in right to an opt-out right, it enjoyed a significant net inflow of corporations in
spite of also raising its franchise fee by 10,000%. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of
Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 948-49 (2012).
337.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (2010) (allowing exculpation of directors and
officers for all but intentional misconduct); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (allowing
companies to opt-in to exculpation except for allegations involving breach of the duty of loyalty, lack of
good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, or transactions in which the directors
receive an improper personal benefit).
338.
See Barzuza, supra note 336, at 940, 994 (describing Nevada as a haven for
managers seeking private benefits of control); see also Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens
in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3593 (2014) (finding that firms incorporated
in Nevada are 30-40% more likely to restate their financial results than firms incorporated in other states).
339.
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for
Corporate Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 (2012).
340.
See Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for
Corporate Law 4 (Yale Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 528, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
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Putting aside the debate over which state has better law, it is clear that Nevada
and Delaware compete.
But even if the market for corporate charters is somewhat competitive, there
may still be significant barriers to entry into the market. Delaware has been the
dominant state of incorporation for more than a century. New entrants would
encounter switching costs and network effects as well as commitment problems.
As described in greater detail below, these barriers center around the pivotal role
of Delaware law, the advantages of Delaware’s judiciary, and the influential role
of the Delaware corporate bar.
1. Switching Costs and Network Externalities
Switching costs arise in markets where repeat buyers require similar or
compatible products.341 The buyers’ need for interoperable products creates
economies of scope for the provider of such products and imposes a cost on firms
for switching away from that provider.342 In the market for corporate charters,
the repeat buyers are not the corporations themselves, but rather the corporate
lawyers that advise them.343 Most corporate lawyers are familiar with Delaware
law—often only with Delaware law—and would accordingly experience
significant costs if forced to learn and apply a different set of rules.344 Delaware’s
continued dominance, in other words, may result as much from lawyers’ path
dependence as it does from a superior corporate law product.345
Closely related to switching costs are network effects. Network effects arise
when a product becomes more valuable as the number of users increase.346 As

/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685969 [http://perma.cc/DZZ3-J69G] (finding that firms that choose Nevada
are predominantly smaller firms with low institutional shareholdings).
341.
Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION HANDBOOK 1967, 1971 (Mark
Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007) (“Switching costs arise if a consumer wants a group, or especially
a series, of his own purchases to be compatible with one another: this creates economies of scope among
his purchases from a single firm.”).
342.
Id.
343.
Firms typically choose where to incorporate only once and therefore do not
anticipate purchasing a series of charters from the state. The lawyers advising them, however, may steer
firms to one state or another, and their familiarity with the law of various jurisdictions may play a decisive
role.
344.
William J. Carney et al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware
Corporate Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 129 (2012) (providing survey evidence showing that lawyers’
ignorance of other states’ laws leads them to recommend Delaware incorporation).
345.
Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV.
1049, 1052 (2015) (providing empirical evidence to argue that “Delaware’s appeal is driven by lawyers’
default decision making based on Delaware’s past preeminence and reflects lawyers’ failure to assess the
value added by Delaware compared to other states”); see also Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim,
Delaware’s Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 291 (2015) (arguing from IPO data that investor
familiarity rather than network externalities explains Delaware’s dominance).
346.
See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 341, at 1971 (“Network effects arise when a
user wants compatibility with other users so that he can interact or trade with them, or use the same
complements; this creates economies of scope between different users’ purchases.”); see also DAVID
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people begin to use telephones, email accounts, or Facebook pages, they generate
“network externalities,” attracting new users not only by the inherent qualities of
the product itself but also by virtue of its widespread use.347 Michael Klausner
has posited the existence of network effects in connection with Delaware
corporate law, focusing largely on judicial opinions.348 In his words:
A judicial opinion that interprets one corporation’s contract term in effect embeds
that interpretation in the contracts of all firms that use the same term. The more
firms that have adopted a particular term, the more likely it is the term will be
litigated, and therefore the more likely that future judicial interpretations will be
349
provided.

Delaware corporate law is valuable, in other words, because the large
number of firms incorporated in Delaware ensures that its courts will have
occasion to provide guidance on a large number of corporate law concerns,
affecting not only the litigants in the particular dispute, but all firms incorporated
in Delaware. Furthermore, the reduction in uncertainty may attract further
incorporations in the state, a feedback loop described by Roberta Romano:
[T]he more firms there are in Delaware, the more legal precedents will be
produced, further providing a sounder basis for business planning, which attracts
even more firms to that state. Finally, the more corporate law cases that are
brought, the greater will be the expertise of the Delaware judges, as will be the
value to an individual from developing such expertise as a member of the
350
judiciary.

The principal network externality of Delaware corporate law is thus the
current existence and future assurance of a large body of judicial precedent.
Furthermore, Delaware may increase its advantage by devising a particularly
difficult to copy body of precedent.351

SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2008) (noting how
network growth makes norm defection prohibitively costly).
347.
Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 341, at 43-44.
348.
See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 761 (1995) (suggesting that network effects may reduce the cost of legal services due
to lawyers’ familiarity with Delaware law). Although this is a theoretical possibility, the legal costs of
Delaware incorporation once litigation exposure is factored in seem to be substantial. Legal services may
therefore fit better as a switching cost, discussed above.
349.
Id. at 776 (“[T]he expected quantity and frequency of judicial interpretations is
positively related to the number of firms that adopt the term. Thus, to the extent that future judicial
interpretations are beneficial, they are network benefits associated with particular corporate contract
terms.”)
350.
ROMANO, supra note 315, at 44.
351.
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998) (“Delaware law may be less determinate than is optimal.”).
Kamar goes on to note, “Although indeterminacy diminishes the value to corporations of Delaware law,
it diminishes the value of rival laws to a greater extent by stymying their compatibility with Delaware
law.” Id.
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Switching costs and network externalities suggest that even if another state
were to introduce improvements on the substantive corporate law, perhaps by
reducing the cost of nuisance litigation, firms might be reluctant to reincorporate
in the other state and their lawyers might be even more reluctant to advise them
to do so.
2. Commitment Problems
A second barrier to entry is the difficulty other states may encounter in
making a credible commitment to maintaining a superior corporate law product.
Firms shopping for a state of incorporation might reasonably fear that states will
defect, as New Jersey did, from an otherwise public, pro-corporate orientation.352
Likewise, corporations may fear that states will raise the cost of incorporation,
perhaps by succumbing to the pressure of the corporate bar, once firms locate
there—effectively adopting the “bargain-then-rip-off” pricing strategy made
famous by retailers everywhere.353 Delaware, by contrast, has a special ability to
credibly commit not to behave opportunistically in the making of corporate law.
Delaware’s commitment not to behave opportunistically is credible because
the state derives such a large portion of its revenues from corporate franchise
fees, the loss of which would throw the state into an immediate fiscal crisis.354
The loss of franchise fee revenue would force legislators to make up the shortfall
either by cutting services or by raising taxes on the electorate—both unpalatable
options. The obvious importance of avoiding this outcome makes Delaware’s
commitment to corporate responsiveness highly credible.
It may be difficult for other states to match the credibility of this
commitment. In particular, larger states with other significant sources of revenue
may be able to weather the loss of franchise tax revenue better than Delaware.
The less dependent a state is on franchise tax revenue, the less credible that
state’s commitment will be to maintaining a responsive, pro-corporate regime.
This theory suggests that Delaware’s most effective competitors may be
relatively small states with few outside sources of revenue and few dominant instate businesses.355 States such as Rhode Island, Maine, and Idaho, for example,
would thus seem more likely competitors than California, New York, and
Illinois.
Nevertheless, as the Nevada example illustrates, these barriers to entry are
not insurmountable. States do compete for corporate charters and there is the
352.
See supra Section I.A.
353.
See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 341, at 8.
354.
See Michael Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 181-82 (2004) (noting that “Delaware’s revenues from its franchise tax amount
to approximately twenty percent of its total revenues” and providing further statistics on Delaware’s
corporation-related revenues and costs).
355.
In-state businesses can lead to distortions that equally affect outside
incorporations. Pennsylvania, for example, adopted a strong anti-takeover law in the 1980s at the behest
of the steel industry.
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potential to generate significant revenue from this competition. So what explains
the failure of states to respond to the crisis in shareholder litigation, if not with
the exact package we have proposed, then perhaps with a set of proposals
designed to arrive at a similar outcome? The explanation, we argue below, lies
with the set of interests in each system that controls corporate law innovation.
B. Interest Group Capture
Interest groups have a large role in determining the form and content of any
regulatory regime. Aside from their managerial and shareholder clients, the
corporate bar is the interest group with the largest stake in the development of
U.S. corporate law.356 The corporate bar, of course, has a strong interest in
maximizing fee income from both deal flow and litigation. And the corporate
bar, as we explore, exerts decisive influence over the development of Delaware
corporate law. In Delaware, as in other U.S. states, “[l]egislative initiatives in
corporate law originate with the corporate bar.”357
Not only is the bar a politically powerful interest group, organized into
guilds and associations to lobby for their interests, the corporate bar controls the
corporate law. “Delaware lawyers . . . are the Delaware legislature, at least
insofar as corporate law is concerned.”358 Changes to the Delaware statute
typically originate with the Delaware bar and receive no legislative resistance or
even review.359 The formal organ through which the bar exerts this authority is
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association and, in
particular, the governing body of that group, the “Council.”360 As described in
greater detail by a member of that organization:
The Council currently consists of twenty-one members, formally elected annually
by the members of the Corporation Law Section. A number of informal traditions
guide the selection of nominees to the Council. As a matter of practice, and in
recognition of the size of their corporate practice groups, seven of the large
commercial law firms in Wilmington have nominated two members each; the
other members practice in smaller firms (or in my case, teach), all in Wilmington.
The members are about evenly distributed between those whose practices
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Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 898 (1990) (explaining that changes to the statute originate with the
Senate Judiciary Committee but reporting a committee member’s view that “if a corporate law bill has the
support of the Delaware Bar Association and the Secretary of State’s office, then it is passed without
amendment or debate”); Lawrence Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1754-55 (2006) (“The members of the Delaware General Assembly . . . have
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360.
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concentrate on litigation and those whose practices gravitate toward transactional
counseling. Also as a matter of practice, the members of the Council include a
number of lawyers—a small minority, to be sure—whose litigation practice is
dominated by representation of shareholder plaintiffs. In 2005, after one
Wilmington firm had developed an ongoing client base of public institutional
investors, the size of the Council was expanded to permit that firm to nominate a
member. Notably absent from the Council, on the other hand, are any in-house
lawyers (i.e., lawyers employed by and primarily representing a single business),
any non-Delaware lawyers, and with one exception, any lawyers from firms not
361
principally based in Delaware.

This guild of local corporate practitioners controls amendments to the
Delaware General Corporation Law. Although they work subject to the norm
that they “leave parochial client interests behind when proposing corporate
legislation,”362 their deliberations are secret.363 It would therefore not be
unreasonable to suppose that even when they succeed in leaving behind client
interests, they do not leave behind their own.
A stark example of the Council’s work is the recent legislative overruling
of fee shifting bylaws. Immediately after the ATP Tour decision authorized fee
shifting bylaws,364 the Delaware bar, recognizing the existential threat,
responded in less than two weeks with a proposed amendment to the Delaware
General Corporation Law that would restore the status quo ante.365 The
amendment, which imposed a per se ban on fee shifting,366 was formally
introduced into the Delaware State Senate on June 3, 2014 with every
expectation that it would soon pass.367 The hasty process was derailed, however,
after significant lobbying from the Chamber of Commerce produced a resolution
holding up the legislation for “continued examination” of the issue.368 This
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See id. § 331 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, neither the
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members of the Council and Senate sponsors”).
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See, e.g., Letter from C. Michael Carter, President & Chief Operating Officer, Dole
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Delaware State Bar Association, its Corporation Law Section, and the Council of that Section . . . to
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resulted in a nine-month delay, after which, on June 11, 2015, the Delaware
legislature enacted the exact same provision that had been proposed nine months
before, without any change in substance or in wording. Tellingly, there was no
evidence of “continued examination” in the twelve-page memorandum the
Council released defending its actions.369 The memorandum contained no
serious analysis of fee shifting or any discussion of alternatives. None of the
voluminous literature on the effects of fee shifting on litigation was cited.370 The
only citations to secondary literature were to three short pieces written by
practitioners.371 Rather than demonstrating careful study of the issue, the
memorandum reads like rhetorical cover for an entrenched group exerting
control to protect its interests.
We assume the bar’s principal interest in corporate law reform lies in
protecting its fee revenue.372 This interest will not necessarily produce a
corporate law that is unbalanced in favor of either managers or shareholders.
Delaware law, it is often said, must retain a balance between shareholder and
managerial interests, and balance is in the bar’s interest as well.373 If the
corporate law becomes too slanted toward shareholder interests, management
may seek to move the corporation from Delaware to a friendlier jurisdiction.374
Fewer Delaware corporations means fewer potential clients and lower expected
fee revenues. Likewise, if the corporate law becomes too slanted toward
managerial interests, the federal government may intervene by effectively taking
all or a part of the corporate law away from the state.375 Federal preemption
reduces the scope of matters on which the Delaware bar can advise, also eroding
its fee base. The Delaware bar’s interests thus are largely aligned with the state’s
in making changes to the corporate law to maximize the number of
incorporations. However, if the problem is the volume and typical outcome of
litigation itself—what we have described as the crisis in U.S. shareholder
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litigation—the bar would seem to be significantly less motivated to correct it,
especially when no other state is promoting itself as a jurisdiction serious about
limiting nuisance litigation.376 Even Nevada, in spite of its emphasis on
minimizing the threat of managerial liability, has proven to be a haven for merger
litigation and disclosure settlements.377 This likely reflects the interests of the
Nevada bar—as long as managerial liability is not a real risk, as in disclosure
settlements, litigation can serve the interests of the bar without compromising
the basic promise of Nevada incorporation.
The situation in the United Kingdom and Ireland is markedly different
because there “the lawyers miraculously disappear.”378 The tradition of selfregulation in the United Kingdom has meant that a different and broader
constituency has had a hand in designing the substantive law, thus limiting the
opportunity for the corporate bar to exert control in furtherance of its own
interests. From a process perspective, meanwhile, the entire system was devised
to avoid the general courts and, not coincidentally, litigators. Although, as noted
above, corporate lawyers together with financial advisers play an important role
in ensuring compliance with the City Code and Irish Rules and in liaising with
the panels and making submissions on behalf of their clients, this generally
remains a less confrontational exercise than in the United States. In addition,
with limited recourse to judicial review, the U.K. and Irish Panels are generally
the final arbiters, and the entire process involves less time and legal expense. The
result is a radically different interest group dynamic that counterbalances the
influence of the bar, preventing lawyers from using the regulatory process to
extract rents.
Back in the United States, the interests of the corporate bar in maximizing
fee revenue from shareholder litigation can only raise the cost of Delaware
incorporation.379 At some point, these costs might grow to a level that spurs
managers and shareholders to reconsider their options.380 But before this can
happen, another state needs to be able to offer a credible alternative, such as our
proposal, that is less vulnerable to being commandeered by the bar.
Unfortunately, this kind of innovation seems possible only where a state’s
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corporate law is not already captured by the bar, as indeed it may be in most, if
not all, U.S. states.
C. A Larger Role for Litigation in the Anglo-Irish System?
There is no movement in either Ireland or the United Kingdom to move
closer to U.S. corporate law in matters of substance. The “no-frustration” rule,
for example, is safely ensconced in Ireland and the United Kingdom, and both
countries remain committed to an open market for corporate control.381 But U.S.
lawyers and U.S.-style litigation have made some inroads on the other side of the
Atlantic.
While it remains highly unusual for any litigation to be initiated in the U.K.
or Irish courts in relation to the takeover or merger of public companies,382 the
takeover of former U.S.-based companies incorporated in Ireland by way of
corporate inversions may have increased the likelihood of U.S.-style litigation in
Ireland.383 For example, in 2013, such a company, the subject of a hostile bid,
sought an injunction prohibiting a bidder from distributing a proxy statement
filed in the United States on the basis that it did not comply with the Irish Rules.
The parties ultimately agreed in court that the matter should be resolved by the
panel pursuant to the Irish Rules.384 Revealingly, the Chairperson of the Irish
Panel used its 2013 Annual Report to express the panel’s hope that this case was
not the start of a trend towards a more litigious approach to public takeovers. In
his words:
If parties do resort to the courts more frequently to resolve issues arising in
connection with takeovers, such actions may introduce legal uncertainty into the
takeover process and may run the risk of prolonging the bid timetable all of which
is unlikely to be in the best interests of shareholders and the market in general.
The Panel is an expert group with significant experience in applying its own rules
and in dealing with issues arising during the course of a takeover. Since its
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establishment the Panel has sought to ensure that matters arising during the course
385
of a takeover are dealt with expeditiously.

This statement reveals the value that the Irish Panel and its core
constituencies place on speed, certainty, and expertise in the context of public
takeover bids as well as the concern that these values would be imperiled by a
trend towards greater litigation in common law courts. Nevertheless, there is
evidence that the trend continued. Two years later, another inverted company,
Perrigo Company, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a hostile
bidder in a case featuring multiple class action suits filed in the United States
against the hostile bidder, its directors, and later, Perrigo and its former CEO.386
Similar actions against companies undergoing inversions regulated by the Irish
panel have ended in disclosure settlements in U.S. courts.387 A panel-based
model does not necessarily foreclose litigation.
In spite of the tendency of U.S.-style litigation to follow U.S. companies
overseas, there is no real pressure in the United Kingdom or Ireland to reform
legal procedures to introduce class actions. Although the Irish Law Reform
Commission in 2005 acknowledged certain advantages afforded by the U.S.style class action procedure, it identified more significant disadvantages
including a loss of autonomy for class members, arbitrary results, high legal
costs, and “a litigious climate” that “target[s] ‘deep-pocket’ defendants.”388 It
recommended instead a formal multi-party action procedural structure, which
would operate on an opt-in basis. 389 These recommendations have not yet been
acted upon.
Conclusion
We have articulated an alternative form of merger regulation to the
dominant U.S. model of regulation by litigation. Our code and panel-based
proposal, built on the U.K. and Irish examples, offers numerous advantages to
the standard litigation-centric model. These advantages include enhanced
predictability, speed, and flexibility, with lower overall administrative expense.
Delaware’s Court of Chancery promises some of these same advantages, but
Delaware is unique among state courts in this regard. Many states do not have
the corporate law caseload to build a comparable body of precedent or similar
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depth of judicial expertise. A code and panel-based model may thus present a
more efficient model for another state seeking to compete with Delaware in the
market for corporate charters. Moreover, the code and panel-based model would
allow a state to copy Delaware’s signal advantages without also importing its
principal weakness—that is, capture by the interests of the corporate bar.
That no state has experimented with a code and panel-based model may
reflect the central role played by the bar in most law reform efforts. Because its
principal source of savings comes from limiting the ability of the corporate bar
to extract rents, the impetus for developing a code and panel-based regime of
merger regulation will likely need to come from outside the practicing bar.
However, given the current crisis in shareholder litigation, the time may be ripe
for reform.
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